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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Firm-level market entry decisions, post-entry survival, and growth are at the core
of the industrial organization literature. A strand of this literature tries to rationalize rms
market-entry or market-exit decisions and post-market-entry-behaviour. Firm turnover
and churning in either domestic markets or international markets play a signicant role
on industry aggregates, and rmsprice schemes directly a¤ect market structure, thereby
a¤ecting social welfare. Dynamic models are o¤en used in the context to explain lots of
empirical facts, such as why rms are willing to enter some unprotable markets. As rms
make their entry decision, it not only depends on the current return, but also relies on the
future payo¤. For instance, when rms anticipate a series of market openings, the literature
claims that the production cost is the key dynamic variable, which may be reduced in future
markets if a rm enters the current market. This reduction is due to a learning-by-doing
mechanism. However, demand may also be an important dynamic variable, which may be
increased in future markets if a rm enters the current market. This increase could be
interpreted as the rm accumulating a customer base or a good reputation in the current
market. Although both supply and demand factors a¤ect rm-level entry decisions, they
have very di¤erent implications: when facing a series of market openings, if cost dynamics
dominate, more and more rms will enter in the later markets. This is because rms
obtain production experience in the earlier markets, and become more e¢ cient, and as
such, they are more likely to enter in the following markets. However, if the demand
dynamics dominate, some rms will be squeezed out by some other in later markets. The
reason is that rms which enter markets more frequently tend to have larger market shares
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in the future markets, which discourage rms with little entry experience to enter future
markets. If we cannot unravel the impact of demand and cost dynamics, we cannot predict
rmsentry decisions precisely. In Chapter 2, the impact of demand and supply factors on
rm-level entry decisions in the pharmaceutical industry has been disentangled.
Cost and demand are two of the most important determinants of rm-level dynam-
ics, both of which a¤ect rm-level market entry, survival, growth and consequently a¤ect
the degree of churning in a market. Recently, one of the most signicant phenomena in
world trade is the success of Chinese manufacturing exports. However, it is not clear that
Chinese exporterssuccess is driven by demand increases or productivity improvements. On
one hand, the rm-level costs are closely associated with rm-level productivity. We believe
that more e¢ cient rms have lower marginal cost, and as such, they are more likely to enter
a market, survive and grow faster. On the other hand, rm-level demand determines the
rms protability also, and we anticipate that a rm with higher demand would behave
more aggressively in a given market, and is more likely to be successful. To clearly under-
stand the success of Chinese exporters, the impact of productivity and demand on rms
need to be separately identied. In Chapter 2, we analyze the determinants of Chinese
exportersmarket selection, survival and subsequent growth in international markets.
It is also of policy importance to distinguish rm-level cost and demand and their
dynamics. For instance, if a policy marker wants to increase market entry rate, he can
simply decrease the entry barriers in the earlier markets when cost dynamics are domi-
nant. Whereas this policy will lead to lower entry rate in the future markets when demand
dynamics are dominant because some entrants become monopolist in the future markets.
Literature Review for Chapter 2
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Firm-level productivity has received considerable attention as an explanation for
rm-level market entry decisions, survival and subsequent growth. Jovanovic (1982) builds
a "passive learning model" to explain why small rms tend to grow fast, and are more
likely to fail. Pakes and Ericson (1995) attribute rm-level growth to the growth of rm-
level productivity. Benkard (2004) uses the example of wide-bodied aircraft to emphasize
the impact of productivity spillovers on rm-level performance: previous production expe-
rience improves a rms protability in future production. Similarly, Gallant et al. (2010)
use productivity spillovers to rationalize the entry behavior of pharmaceutical rms. They
argue that the reason that rms are willing to enter a currently unprotable market is be-
cause they reduce their costs in future markets. By comparison, the rm-level idiosyncratic
demand shocks received less attention. Firm-level idiosyncratic demand also a¤ects rms
protability and its corresponding market entry decisions. One example is that many airline
companies like to concentrate their purchases from the same air plane company. American
Airlines and South West purchase from the Boeing Fleet, while Aer Lingus and German-
wings buy from the Airbus Fleet. Another example is that rms can bundle their new
product to their other existing products to discourage entrants from new product markets.
In this way rms bundling their products increase their demand in the new product market,
and exclude potential entrants. This impact of demand from existing product markets to
a new product market is called the market foreclosure e¤ect by Whinston (1990), and this
e¤ect can be treated as a sourse of demand loyalty. Klemperer and Padilla (1997) claim
that by providing an additional product a rm can capture customers from its competitor.
This e¤ect is called demand spillovers: loyalty e¤ects encourage customers to concentrate
their purchases from the same provider. A number of reasons can rationalize loyalty e¤ect,
such as customerssearch costs, the cost of learning how to use a new product, uncertainty
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over new product quality, or product compatibility with existing products. Gavazza (2011)
further conrms the importance of demand spillovers in the U.S mutual fund market: The
largest four fund families experience disproportional growth and almost double their mar-
ket share from 1992-2007. The mechanism which leads to the demand spillovers is that
customers have loyalty to a product they have purchased and this loyalty can easily extend
to another product under the same brand. As such, rms with larger historical sales tend
to have higher sale in the future, and rms can leverage this demand spillovers to their
other products. Foster et al (2010) attribute the slow convergence of US manufacturing
rmssales to rm-level demand: growth of a customer base or building a reputation, for
example that take considerable time to play out.[9] Disney et al (2003) also point out that
the performance of an plant depends on other plants owned by the same rm. They argue
that if a plant is owned by a "group" owner, the exit rate tends to be lower as this plant
has a larger customer base built by other plants owned by the same rm.
Starting from Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a), there is a growing empirical literature
that studies rmsentry and exit decisions. The early literature focuses on a static entry
game. Berry (1992) analyzes airlinesdecisions to set up non-stop ights between city-pairs;
Scott-Morton (1999) estimates which characteristics of the generic drug market openings
attract more entrants; Mazzeo (2002) studies the US motel market by allowing the represen-
tative motel to simultaneously choose his service quality and locations. Seim (2006) further
extends Mazzeo (2002) by adding rm side heterogeneities to his model, and applies his
model to predict US videotape rmslocation and product decisions. Benkard (2004) rst
mentions dynamic supply side spillovers in aircraft industry. Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja
(2010) similarly estimate supply side spillovers in the pharmaceutical industry to explain
rm-level over-entry patterns, when new drug market openings appear. They nd that each
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entry reduces future costs by approximately 7% at the next entry opportunity. In contrast
to Benkard (2004) and GHK (2010), Foster et al. (2010) stress demand side spillovers.
They attribute rmsmarket share growth to their idiosyncratic demand growth, and this
demand growth will signicately a¤ects rm-level entry and exit diecisions. Gavazza (2011)
also emphasizes demand side spillovers in the U.S fund market: rms with more demand
are less likely to exit the market.
Literature Review for Chapter 3
In addition to domestic market, rm-level productivity is also emphasized in in-
ternational markets. Melitz (2003) explains the di¤erence of rm-level export decision to
international markets by the heterogeneity of rm-level productivity. In particular, rms
with higher productivity are more likely to export and survive in international markets.
Aw et al (2000) conrm this idea by using the data from Taiwanese exporters. Branstetter
and Lardy (2008) point out that the success of Chinese exporters is because of their low
labor and input cost. Manova and Zhang (2011, 2012) also document that among Chinese
exporters the di¤erences of pricing and quality are large. Although received less atten-
tions, the demand impact also be documented in the international trade literature. Das,
Roberts and Tybout (1997) argue that among exporters with nearly identical productvity
have distinguished export outcomes. Rho and Rodrigue (2012), and Hu et al. (2013) claim
that demand factors a¤ect exporters prot, survival and growth by using the evidences from
Indonesian and Chinese exporters. Hu et al. (2013) argue that among Chinese exporters,
the demand dispersions are several times larger than productivity dispersion, and the de-
mand heterogeneity is the key determinant of rm-level market entry, survival and growth,
while the e¤ect of productivity is negligible. Roberts et al. (2013) separately identify the
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demand and productivity e¤ect in the Chinese footwear industry, and nd that demand
and productivity are equally important to rm-level pricing, and quantity of sales. In the
next two chapters, we estimate the impact of demand and productivity on rm-level market
entry decision, survival and growth in pharmaceutical industry and international markets
in Charter 2 and Chapter 3, respectively.
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CHAPTER II
Dynamic Entry with Demand and Supply Side Spillovers: The Case of Pharmaceutical
Industry
Introduction
In this chapter I disentangle di¤erent types of spillovers on rm-level entry deci-
sions by separately identifying demand and supply side spillovers on rm-level protability.
One of the most signicant decisions a rm makes is whether or not to enter a new market.
In a dynamic environment, a rms current decision not only a¤ects current prot, but also
has spillovers upon its future protability. For instance, experience in one market may po-
tentially improve rm performance in another related product market. This improvement
implies that a rms decision to enter a product market is determined not only by the prof-
its associated with this market, but also the enhanced protability in future markets. The
literature attributes the spillovers to the supply side, in particular, the type of spillovers
which reduce a rms cost in later markets given that it has previous entry experience. The
cost reduction has been deemed the main reason of over-entry phenomenon. This phenom-
enon is a well known empirical pattern that many rms enter small markets which only can
accommodate a small number rms, and some or all of them receive negative prots.
Demand side spillovers have received less attention. Demand side spillovers could
also improve a rms protability in later markets if previous entry allows the rm to in-
crease market share in other markets. The increase in market share may result from brand
loyalty or an enlarged customer base from previous market entry. There are a number of
explanations for brand loyalty, such as the cost of establishing new trading relationships,
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learning how to use a new product, uncertainty over product quality, or product compati-
bility with existing products.
To understand the di¤erent implications of demand side spillovers and supply side
spillovers, consider similar rms with di¤erent entry experience. One of them has entered
a lot of markets (with many product varieties), and the other is completely new. When a
new market opening appears, supply side spillovers harm the protability of the new rm
indirectly by increasing the more experienced rms entry probability. Similarly, demand
side spillovers generate losses to the new rm by indirectly increasing the other rms
entry probability and directly shrinking the new rms post-entry market share. The direct
impact of demand side spillovers is called market foreclosure e¤ect (Whinston (1990)). The
identication of the two types of spillovers are intuitive: supply side spillovers a¤ect a rms
entry through its own entry expirience (a more experienced rm is more likely to enter new
market), while demand side spillovers a¤ect the rms entry through the relative entry rates
of himself and his competitors, (a relatively more experienced rm inclined to enter more
o¤en). Therefore, the variation in the rates of absolute and relative entry identify the two
types of spillovers.
In the generic pharmaceutical industry, future benets from current entry could
arise from future cost reductions, or from an increased customer base, brand reputation, or
loyalty. The previous channel is frequently mentioned in the learning literature, in which
rms learn the production, advertising, and sale process after entering a current market.
This experience reduces the subsequent costs associated with future markets; for the demand
channel, Klemperer and Padilla (1997) show that a rm is able to capture business from his
competitors in a product market by o¤ering an additional product when consumers prefer
to concentrate their purchases with a single supplier. Although this claim is made in a
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static framework, it can be easily applied to a dynamic setting by treating di¤erent markets
as di¤erent products. The only di¤erence is that under a static framwork, a rm needs to
decide how many produts he wants to o¤er at one time, while in a dynamic setting, a rm
has to sequentially make market-entry decisions. Regardless of which channel determines
entry, a rm may enter a currently unprotable market to gain advantages in future markets.
In this paper, a model incorporating both dynamic supply and demand spillovers is built
to explain a rms market entry decision. This model allows a rms current market share
and total costs to vary with past entry experience. A rms market share and cost evolves
endogenously with the rm-level entry decisions. Endogenous entry causes heterogeneity
across rms, even if they are ex ante identical.
While supply spillovers play a role in future cost reductions, demand side spillovers
play a role in future market share increases. Both types of spillovers indicate that a rms
past entry (and production) enhances his performance in future markets. This paper sep-
arately identies demand side spillovers and supply side spillovers in the pharmaceutical
industry. Intuitively, both spillovers may exist in the pharmaceutical industry, since rms
may simultaneously reduce future costs and build brand reputation through past entry.
In order to estimate our model, there are two main methodological challenges that
need to be addressed. One challenge in our dynamic game setting is that a rms entry
decision depends not only on their own states, but also his rivals entry decisions. This
strategic interaction invalidates the methods proposed by Rust (1987), and Hotz and Miller
(1993). In these papers, the individuals decision only depends on his own state, whereas in
our paper, the estimation is based on non-cooperative equilibrium among rms. The second
challenge is the continuous state variables. The continuity features rule out the method of
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), which requires the conditional choice probabilities (CCP)
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at all possible states. Instead, the estimation technique here follows GHK (2010), and uses
Bayesian MCMC methods to overcome these di¢ culties.
In this paper, we nd that past entry experience has an important impact on rm
performance in subsequent markets. When only supply side spillovers are allowed, the costs
in the future markets may fall by as much as 7%. This result is close to its counterpart in
GHK (2010). In contrast, when we incorporate demand side spillovers, the supply spillover
e¤ect becomes insignicantly di¤erent from zero, whereas demand spillovers increase rms
future market share by 34 percent at the next market opening. The results show that
demand side spillovers dominate supply spillovers in the pharmaceutical industry when
both of them are considered together. The results indicate that lowering entry barriers
is not an e¢ cient method to encourage competition in the pharmaceutical industry, as
experienced rms will squeeze out new rms in future makets by attenuating market share
for new ones.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in section 2, the background of
generic pharmaceutical industry and the corresponding data are introduced. A dynamic
model containing both demand and supply side spillovers is formally presented in section 3.
Section 4 discusses the models solution, and section 5 presents the likelihood function. We
introduces the choice of priors for all parameters, and the estimated results are discussed
in section 6. Section 7 performs a policy experiment based on model estimates. Finally, we
conclude this chapter in section 8.
Background and Data
Generic drugs, which are substitutes for brand-name drugs, are almost bioequiv-
alent to the brand-name drugs, but less expensive. Generic pharmaceutical sales account
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for a considerable share in GDP in U.S. In 2007, total sales were valued at $58.5 billion.
In the same year, 65% prescriptions in the U.S were made up of generics. In order to pro-
mote generics as well as lower the drug price, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 (usually referred to as the Waxman-Hatch Act) was enacted to
lower barriers to entry for generic rms by permitting Abbreviated New Drug Applications
(ANDAs). This act promotes market entry, because generic rms only need to submit bioe-
quivalence studies, instead of repeating all the expensive and time consuming tests that the
manufacturer of the pioneer branded product had gone through to gain Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) approval. The Waxman-Hatch act has resulted in a lot of biologically
equivalent drugs. According to a report of the FDA in 2004, there were 941 new drug and
biologics license application approvals between 1995 and 2004, only one third were dened
by the FDA as containing an active substance that has never before been approved for
marketing in any form in the United States.
Although the Waxman-Hatch act lowers entry barriers for entry, there remains a
signicant sunk entry cost associated with submitting an ANDA, even if it is much less than
the cost of inventing a new drug. These sunk entry costs range from $250,000 to $20 million
(Scott-Morton (1999)). In addition, the generic drug market is risky. Empirical experience
shows that only 3 out of every 20 approved drugs bring in su¢ cient revenue to cover their
costs. These signicant sunk costs and uncertainties in each market cause the number of
entrants to be small. In 1989, the notorious "generic scandal" was exposed, in which some
FDA reviewers confessed to accepting bribes to expedite ANDAs, and some data submitted
by rms was falsied in order to pass the FDA process. During this "scandal period", the
market structure may be di¤erent from the post-scandal period. Because of the possibility
of structural change, the data points in the scandal period are disposed of to avoid biasing
13
the analysis.
As discussed in Scott-Morton (1999), entry is rarely announced, because rms
who have private information do not want to signal the common market value, attract
potential entrants and increase competition. They also fear that the delay in the approval
will invite competition. There are few late sequential movers who withdraw in response
to rivals approvals. As such, simultaneous entry decisions are a striking feature of the
pharmaceutical industry.
The original data was assembled by Scott-Morton (1999), and was sorted by GHK
(2010) later. This data set consists of all ANDA approvals between 1984 to 1994. To
implement the estimation, the variables we are using for each market opportunity include
the ANDA approval date, market revenue in the year before the patent expires, and entry
decision of potential entrants. Because uncertainty and exogenous factors may alter rms-
level decisions during the scandal period, we focus on the period after the scandal, 1990-1994.
In this period there are 40 market openings for which the previous revenue data are not
missing, and 51 rms who entered at least once. The top 3 dominant rms in the sample
after 1989 are Mylan, which entered 45 percent of the markets, Novopharm entered 28, and
Lemmon entered 25 of the markets.
In our analysis, we only consider the strategic interaction of the top 3 rms. The
remaining rms are referred to as "other rms", and their small size and market share
are assumed not to a¤ect the top rmsentry decision. In this analysis, the market share
occupied by other rms is simply neglected.
Model
In this section we present a dynamic model of rm entry with both demand side
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and supply side spillovers. Because of the computational burden of solving the model in
markets with many entrants, we restrict the strategic interaction to the 3 dominant rms.
Each dominant rm maximizes his discounted prots in an innite series of market openings
t = 1; 2:::1: Each market opening opportunity is dened as the time when a drugs patent
protection expires. In a bid to maximize the discounted prots, each rm makes their entry
decision at market t based on the current prots associated with market t and the impact
of the decision on future protability. Since market openings appear in the time horizon,
in the following context, t will be used interchangeably to denote a market opening or the
time period associated with it. If a rm decides to enter a market, he collects prots over all
future periods, instead of realizing all prots in one period. However, this feature makes the
dynamic model hard to estimate, because two time horizons are entangled in this model:
one is within each market t, the other is over di¤erent market openings. To make the model
computationally feasible, we assume rms realize all prots in each market in a lump-sum
form.
When market t opens, rm is entry decision is denoted by Ait = f0; 1g: If rm i
chooses to enter market t, Ait = 1, otherwise, Ait = 0. In each market t, rmsdecisions
are observed by whether they submit an ANDA or not. The number of total entrants in
market t is given by
Nt =
3X
i=1
Ait (II.1)
The possible sources of dynamics are through cost and market share. If a rm
entered a previous market, their protability may be enhanced later. This increase in prots
could be the result of a cost reduction from previous experience, or a demand increase from
an enlarged customer base. To separately identify the sources of dynamics, we impose some
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structure on the model. Particularly, current costs, Cit are determined by previous entry
decisions and random shocks. We assume evolution of cost is governed by the following
equation:
cit = log(Cit) = uc + c(ci;t 1   uc)  kcAi;t 1 + ceit (II.2)
where uc is a location parameter representing the average log cost; kc is the direct cost
spillover e¤ect in current market t if rm i enters market t  1; and the cost spillovers last
more than one period through the persistence parameter c;ceit is the cost shock which
follows a normal distribution with zero mean and variance 2c . Equation (II.2) implies that
if kc is positive, a rms past entry experience reduces their cost in later markets.
Firm is expected market share1 Sit conditional on all rms entering market t is
governed by the following equation:
Sit =
exp
 

t 1X
m=1
Ait m
!
3X
j=1
exp
 

t 1X
m=1
Ajt m
! (II.3)
where the parameter measures the magnitude of the demand spillovers. Equation
(II.3) implies that if  is positive, a rms previous entry experience increases his market
share given that his rivals keep the same strategies. If there are rms which do not enter
market t; we assume their market shares are split by the other rms proportionally to their
conditional market shares. The actual market share for rm i in market t is:
it = AitSit=
24 3X
j=1
AjtSjt
35 (II.4)
We assume, as in GHK (2010), that this is a game with complete information.
1This expected market share can be generated by consumersheterogeneous preference toward di¤erent
products in a market. In particular, consumers in general prefer a brand which has been seen or used before.
Therefore, a rm with more market entry experience could ensure a large expected market share, whereas a
rm, which rarely enter markets before, only anticipates a small expected market share.
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Hence, all rms observe each others costs, as well as expected their market shares2. Total
revenue in market t is approximated by the revenue in the previous year, when the drug
was on patent. Therefore, when rms make their entry decision at market t, the revenue
Rt associated with this market is treated as known, because rms can observe the previous
years revenue.
The uncertainties originate from the corresponding costs and revenue in future
markets. The realization of revenue Rt+1 = exp(rt+1) is assumed to take the following
form:
rt+1 = ur + rer;t+1 (II.5)
where, ur is a location parameter, and er;t+1 is a random shock to the revenue in market
t + 1, with standard normal distribution. Equation (II.5) implies that when rms make
decisions at time t, they conjecture on the revenue in market t+ 1.
This structure allows us to write the prots it for dominant rm i in market t as:
it = Ait(itRt   Cit) (II.6)
The rms discounted prots at time t are
1X
j=0
jAi;t+j
 
i;t+jRt+j   Ci;t+j

(II.7)
where  is a discount parameter within the interval (0; 1): The rm maximizes the sum of
discounted prots by making his entry decision in each market given that other rms adopt
their equilibrium actions.
2Since a rms market entry history is observable, the expected market share is given by (3a).
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The choice specic Bellman equation can be written as:
Vi(Ai;t; A i;t; Ci;t; C i;t; itRt;  i;tRt) (II.8)
= Ait(itRt   Cit)
+EVi

(AEi;t+1; A
E
 i;t+1; Ci;t+1; C i;t+1; i;t+1Rt+1;  i;t+1Rt+1)jSTit

where Sit=(Ait; A it; Cit; C it; itRt;  itRt),  i represents all the other rms with respect
to rm i, AEi;t+1 is the equilibrium strategy for rm i, and A
E
 i;t+1 is a equilibrium strategy
vector of other rms. The choice specic value function (II.8) gives the discounted prots
for rm i if he chooses action Ait at time t and all rms play equilibrium actions from
t+ 1 onwards. The expectation is over the distribution of cost shocks, revenue, and actual
market shares in market t+1 conditional on all the realizations of states and actions taken
at time t.
The best response strategy prole (AEit ; A
E
 it) as the stationary pure strategy
Markov perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game satises:
Vi(A
E
it ; A
E
 it; Cit; C it; itRt;  itRt)  Vi(STit) (II.9)
The value function (not the choice specic value function) is
Vi(Cit; C it; itRt;  itRt) = A
E
it(itRt   Cit) (II.10)
+E

Vi(Ci;t+1; C i;t+1; i;t+1Rt+1; i;t+1Rt+1)jAEit ; AE it; Cit; C it; itRt;  itRt

Our estimation strategy relies on the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium.
Because of this we cannot apply the single agent methods Rust (1987) or Hotz and Miller
(1993). The equilibrium based estimation raises two di¢ culties. The rst is to calculate the
equilibrium. Without knowing what actions the rivals will take, a representative rm needs
18
to compare his discounted prots under every possible action prole of his rivals. Within
Bayesian estimation, the required parameters can be drawn from a prior, and updated by
comparing likelihoods computed under di¤erent sets of parameters.
The second di¢ culty is the number of equilibria. One possibility is that there may
be no pure strategy equilibrium at some given parameters, an other is multiple equilibria at
some given parameters, while last one the model may deliver an a unique Nash equilibrium
in each market. If there is no equilibrium, we simply dispose of that set of parameters, and
draw a new set of parameters. In other words the parameters are only updated when they
generate an equilibrium in pure strategies. When there are multiple equilibria, we follow
Berry (1992) in the selection of equilibrium. Specically, when there are multiple equilibria,
the equilibrium with the minimum total cost will be chosen as the equilibrium to be used
in estimation. The details about estimating the model under pure strategies and unique
equilibrium are discussed in section 4.
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Solving the Model
In the estimation, a nested approach is employed to solve the dynamic model. The
broad outline of the computational strategy is as follows: (1) Draw a set of parameters by
means of the MCMC algorithm. (2) For each set of parameters, generate the state variables
over the sample period. (3) Solve the dynamic game to compute the equilibrium outcome as
a function of the state variables. (4) Use the equilibrium outcome to compute the likelihood
relying on the observed entry data. (5) Use the likelihood depending only on observed
variables to make an acceptance-rejection decision within the MCMC algorithm. Repeat
steps (1)(5) to generate an MCMC chain which is drawn from the posterior distribution of
the parameters. In the above outline, the two main tasks are computing the equilibrium and
calculating the likelihood. In this section, we describe the details for solving the equilibrium
of the dynamic game. In section 5, we discuss how to calculate the likelihood function with
the solved equilibrium and latent parameters.
Within the dynamic model, we look for a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium,
which requires solving the xed point of the Bellman equation (II.10). At each market
opening t, rms make their entry decisions. The strategy prole At played by all rms at
time t is denoted as
At = (A1t; A2t; A3t) (II.11)
The equilibrium strategy prole should be a function of state variables
(C1t; C2t; C3t; 1tRt; 2tRt; 3tRt)
costs and market share of all rms. The vector of the log of the state variables at time t is
st = (c1t; c2t; c3t; log(1t); log(2t); log(3t); rt) (II.12)
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Given a set of parameters, the game is solved as follows:
1. Approximate the value function at each market opening t by a linear equation,
V (st) = b +Bst; where b is a constant vector, and B is a coe¢ cient matrix.
2. Search for the xed point of V (s) = (V 1 (s); V 2 (s); V 3 (s)) by initializing the value
function V 0(s) = 0+ 0 st; where the superscript indicates the number of iterations.
Here the search starts with (b0; B0) being set to 0.
3. Compute best response strategy for each rm over sample period. The best response
strategy requires the formula of the expected future value function
E

V 0i (st+1)jAt; st

for each rm i. We obtain the above formula as follows: at each st; given any strategy
prole Aj of all rms, we generate the next period state variables stj ; where j =
1; 2; ::::J: The variable stj is the future possible states around st; but shifted by strategy
prole Aj : Each stj contains the dynamic e¤ect of strategy prole Aj and systematic
cost shocks and demand shocks. The expectation is the sum of the value function at
di¤erent stj :
EV (st+1jAt; st) = E

b0 +B0st+1

(II.13)
 b0 + 1
J
JX
j=1
B0stj
4. Calculate the value function at all possible strategy proles, and make use of equation
(II.9) to select the best response strategy prole AEj . We record the value function with
the best response strategy prole for each market t as V 0(st) = (V 01 (st); V
0
2 (st); V
0
3 (st)):
5. Regress V 0(st) on a constant and state variables to get b1 and B1: The new (b1; B1)
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is an update of (b0; B0).
6. Iterate step 3 to step 5 to nd the new equilibrium prole under new coe¢ cients
(b1; B1) to update (b1; B1) to (b2; B2). Keep doing this until (bk; Bk) becomes stable.
7. The xed point of the value function is V (s) = bk +Bks:
To summarize the procedure, we rst solve the equilibrium by guessing the co-
e¢ cients of the value function. After solving the corresponding equilibrium given the co-
e¢ cients, the value function V () at each state st can be computed. T value functions
are calculated over the sample periods, and these values are regressed on state variables
to update the coe¢ cients of value function. This procedure continues until all coe¢ cients
become stable. In the procedure, it is possible that no equilibrium exists for some sets of
parameters. In this case, these parameters are considered to be an irrelevant portion of the
parameter space, and are rejected in the MCMC likelihood comparison step.
Our model may also deliver multiple equilibria. For example, suppose we have
a situation where one rm entering a market is protable, but two entrants make loss for
both. In this situation, either rm entering the market is an equilibrium. Alternatively it
may be that taking the same strategy as the rival does is protable for the rm3. In the
last case, having both rms enter or having both stay out of the market are equilibria.
We follow Berry (1992) to deal with multiple equilibria by adopting a selection
rule. The rule is to select the equilibrium with the minimum total cost of all rms as
the equilibrium. Specically, at market t, there is a total cost of Ct = C1t + C2t + C3t
associated with an action prole At = (A1t; A2t; A3t): These action proles are ordered by
their associated total cost: the rst action prole is associated with the lowest total costs
3This case can be interpreted as rms choosing to protect their comparative advantage in future markets.
That is they may like to take the same strategy as their rival to keep themselves in a safe position.
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and the last action prole has highest total costs. The equilibrium action prole with the
smallest costs is the equilibrium action prole selected.
In this section, the procedure of solving for the equilibrium given a set of para-
meters was described. This can be treated as an inner routine. The outer routine consists
of sequentially drawing di¤erent sets of parameters, comparing their corresponding likeli-
hood functions, and saving the draws which increase the likelihood function with a certain
probability. We will discuss the construction of the likelihood function next.
Likelihood Computation
Because we are estimating a game of pure strategies, a density for the strategy
prole At that depends only on state St = (Cit; C2t; C3t; 1tRt; 2tRt; 3tRt) and the model
parameters would generate a value of one for the likelihood when the prediction is coincident
with observed actions, and a value of zero for likelihood when the prediction is not. This
feature would generate mass of one on a single value of At:
To solve this problem, we follow GHK (2010) by dening a misclassication prob-
ability qa = a   pa; 0 < pa < 1; and the likelihood function for an observed action prole
A0t is dened as follows
p(A0t jCit; C2t; C3t; 1tRt; 2tRt; 3tRt; ) =
3Y
i=1
(pa)
I(A0it=Ait)(1  pa)I(A0it 6=Ait) (14)
where Ait is predicted entry decision computed from the model given state St and  is the
set of parameters to be estimated.
 = (u1,1; uc; c; r; c; kc; ) (II.14)
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The full likelihood for the data is
TY
t=1
p(A0t jCit; C2t; C3t; 1tRt; 2tRt; 3tRt; ) (II.15)
We interpret the misclassication probability as follows. Consider a rm which decides to
enter a market and submit his ANDA. However, with some probability his ANDA will be
rejected, even if he decides to enter. This rejection does not allow his entry decision to be
realized, and the rejection probability is the misclassication probability.
Because the pre-scandal data may be generated from a di¤erent market structure,
we focus on the post-scandal data to compute the likelihood. Between 1990 and 1994 there
are forty markets in total without missing revenue date after the scandal. In the rst period,
there is no information about the demand and supply spillovers. We use two pre-scandal
periodsentry behavior to generate the rm-level entry histories. Alternatively, the rst
period is treated as the initial period, in which all rms are ex-ante equivalent. The results
suggest that no signicant di¤erence between the two approaches.
Identication
Another critical question is the identication of the structural model. Supply side
spillovers a¤ect a rms entry likelihood by this rms entry history. The uctuation of
entry histories for each rm helps to identify supply side spillovers. Demand side spillovers
a¤ect a rms entry likelihood by this rms entry history relative to competitors. Given this
rms entry history, its entry likelihood varies when competitors have di¤erent histories. The
variation of relative entry histories allow us to identify demand side spillovers. For instance,
consider two rms with the same entry histories. If they enter the same future markets,
revenues are always evenly split. The two rmsentry behaviors help to identify supply
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side spillovers, as they always have the same relative entry history; no demand spillover is
associated with entry. The identication of demand side spillovers comes from another rm
with a di¤erent entry history: when all three rms simultaneously enter some markets, the
third rm has a di¤erent market share from the other two rms. The di¤erence of market
shares, along with the identied supply spillovers by the two rms with the same entry
history, identies the demand side spillovers. The correlation coe¢ cient of rmsabsolute
and relative entry histories is 0.33. The low correlation further implies that we can make
use of the variation of absolute and relative entry histories to separately identify demand
and supply side spillovers.
Parameter Estimation
As discussed in section 4, the estimation method contains an inner routine and an
outer routine. The outer routing the MCMC method is used to draw the parameters from
a onemove-at-a-time random walk proposal density. Given the old draw o; a new draw is
made from a conditional distribution q(jo): Denote the likelihood by L(), and the piror
by (): The actual next period parameter 0 is generated as follows:
1. Draw  according to q(jo):
2. Let a = min
n
1; L(
)()q(jo)
L(o)(o)q(oj)
o
:
3. If there is no equilibrium at parameter ; set 0 = o; otherwise with probability a,
set 0 =  and with probability (1  a) set 0 = o:
We choose q(jo) to be a conditional normal distribution, in which  is drawn
from a normal distribution with mean o; so as to facilitate the outer routine computation.
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In this way, q(jo) = q(oj); and the acceptance probability in step 2 can be written as
a = min
n
1; L(
)()
L(o)(o)
o
:
Because we do not want to impose many restrictions on the parameters, we use
a non-informative prior () with at tails: log u1  U [ 3; 3]; log uc  U [ 3; 3]; log 1 
U [ 3; 3]; log c  U [ 3; 3]; log r  U [ 3; 3]; kc  U [ 1; 1]; c  U [0; 1], and   U [0; 2]:
The time discount parameter  and the misclassication parameter pa are not estimated in
the program. Following the literature we set  = 0:95; and pa = 0:9375:
Results
GHK (2010) claim that rmsover-entry behavior is caused by supply spillovers,
which reduce the total costs by 7 percent. To make the estimates comparable to GHK, we
rst estimate the model under supply side spillovers only by shutting o¤ the demand side
spillovers,  = 0, and update the remaining parameters. We then repeat the exercise with
both demand and supply side spillovers. The key parameter in the second column of Table 1
is kc, which is the measure of supply spillovers. The estimate of kc is close to its counterpart
in GHK (2010), likewise, the other parameters are close to those previously estimated in
the literature. The results from the model with supply side spillovers implies that rms
can reduce future costs by 7 percent if they enter the current product market. In the third
column, we report the results when both demand and supply spillovers are introduced in
the model. It is not surprising to nd that the magnitude of supply spillovers falls after
introducing demand spillovers, while the parameter of  measuring demand side spillovers is
signicantly positive. Past entry experience has negative impact4 (if we temporarily ignore
the huge variance in kc) on costs in the later markets, but rms can increase their market
4There are a number of explanations for the negative impact of past entry on future protability. These
include diseconomies of scale or diseconomies of scope on technogical investment costs.
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share in the later markets through demand spillovers. It is worthwhile to point out that
 itself is not a direct measure of market share increase, but market share increase can
be calculate from : The detailed market share increase caused by demand side spillovers
is presented in Table 2. The di¤erence in the value of kc across columns implies that in
the pharmaceutical industry, the pattern of rm-level over-entry behavior is largely deter-
mined by demand spillovers. Moreover, if we ignore demand spillovers, the researchers will
incorrectly estimate the supply spillover e¤ect.
Table 1: Posterior Distribution
Posterior Distribution
with Supply Spillovers Only
Posterior Distribution
with Supply and Demand Spillovers
Parameter 3-Firm Case
uc 10.3488 (0.2993) 10.5238 (0.2188)
ur 11.8320 (0.4253) 10.2971 (0.2275)
c 0.4811 (0.0452) 0.2485 (0.0881)
r 1.6902 (0.0138) 1.6625 (0.0127)
kc 0.0677 (0.0206) -0.0787 (0.1363)
c 0.8405 (0.1086) 0.8553 (0.1098)
 0.95 0.95
pa 0.9375 0.9375
 0.1664 (0.0128)
MCMC Rep 10000 10000
To shed light on the role of demand spillovers, we dene f1t(Aij ; A i;j) as rm i
market share in market t+ 1 conditional on having entered market t, and f2(Aij ; A i;j) as
rm is market share in market t+ 1 given that he has not entered market t:
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f1(Aij ; A i;j) =
exp
240@ t 1X
j=1
Aij + 1
1A  
35
exp
240@ t 1X
j=1
Aij + 1
1A  
35+ exp
24 tX
j=1
A i;j  
35 (II.16)
f2(Aij ; A i;j) =
exp
240@ t 1X
j=1
Aij
1A  
35
exp
240@ t 1X
j=1
Aij
1A  
35+ exp
24 tX
j=1
A i;j  
35 (II.17)
Then, rm is marginal market share from entering market t; conditional on the actual entry
history, can be computed as follows:
MMSit = f1(Aij ; A ij)  f2(Aij ; A i;j) (II.18)
where MMSit is marginal market share of rm i at market t.
The average marginal share increase caused by demand spillovers for each rm
over all markets are reported in Table 2. Market level results are reported in Table 4 (in
the Appendix). Table 2 shows that in our sample, the past entry increases the current
market share of each rm by 3% to 4% on average, given that his rivals keep the same entry
decision. The increase in market share enhances rmsprotability, and hence gives them
the incentive to enter markets even associated with relatively low revenue.
Table 2: The Average Marginal Market Share Gain From Entry
AMMS
Firm 1 0.0406
Firm 2 0.0331
Firm 3 0.0313
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As discussed above, rm-level market-entry decisions depend on expected prots. I
use a simple example to show how the two types of spillovers di¤erently a¤ect these expected
prot. Consider two rms that face a market opening. Firm i has no entry experience before,
but rm j has entered many past markets. Since rm i has no entry history, it is isolated
from neither cost spillovers nor demand spillovers. While cost spillovers alone a¤ect rm is
expected prot by changing rm js entry probability, demand spillovers not only change
rm jentry probability, but also rm is after-entry-revenue. In this example, the impact
of supply spillovers on rm i is indirect (through changing the entry probability of rm j
only), but the demand spillovers have both indirect and direct impact on rm i.
Policy Experiments
The benet of estimating a structural model is the ability to perform the coun-
terfactual policy experiments. To distinguish the di¤erent implications of demand side
spillovers and supply side spillovers, three experiments have been performed. The objective
of these experiments is to measure how a policy maker could encourage entry by lowering
entry barriers in di¤erent scenarios. These experiements are of policy interests as entry
can a¤ect the market structure, and further the social welfare. Policy marker may want to
interefare the market structures to change some characteristics of market to increase the
social welfare. In the rst experiment, the average number of entrants before and after
barrier reduction is computed by assuming no spillover. The second and third experiments
repeat the exercise with only supply spillovers and only demand spillovers, respectively.
In each experiment, 50 market openings are simulated, and a policy maker is able
to decrease the total costs of potential entrants by 20 percent in the rst 10 markets through
lowering the entry cost. Particularly, in the rst 10 markets, the cost location parameter
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becomes 0:8uc. The features of markets and potential entrants are characterized by the
parameters estimated in the last section. In particular, the revenue, and costs associated
with each market are respectively drawn from N(ur; r), and N(uc; c). In the no spillovers
and demand spilloverscases, we used parameters from the third column of Table 1. In the
supply spillovers case, we used parameters from the second column of Table 1. Each
potential entrant makes its entry decision based on state variables, which are di¤erent in
di¤erent experiments. The rst and second columns are the entry rate before and after cost
reduction, and the third column reports the change of Herndahl index change before and
after cost reduction.
Table 3: Average Entry Before and After Cost Reduction
Average # of Entrants
No Cost Reduction
Average # of Entrants
with Cost Reduction
Change of Herndahl Index
Before and After Cost Reduction
Benchmark (No Spillovers) 1.08 1.21 -0.06
Supply Spillovers 1.68 1.80 -0.10
Demand Spillovers 1.24 1.13 +0.03
Table 3 rst shows that with and without cost reduction (lowering entry barrier),
if supply spillovers exist solely in an indstry, that industry tends to have the highest entry
rate5. This result is reasonable in a sense that supply spillovers increase rms average
protability in later markets, whereas demand spillovers only shift the market share among
rms, which raise the protability for one rm by hurting the other rms. Second, in the
benchmark and supply spillovers case, a policy maker could enhance market entry rate and
competition by lowering entry barrier, but in the demand spillover case, lowering entry
barrier results in lower entry rate and less competition (more concentration). The reason
is that with demand spillovers, one rm that entered early markets became very powerful,
5We need to be aware that the mean of ur is higher in the supply spilloverscase than that of the no
spilloversand demand spilloverscase. This higher average revenue partly leads to a higher entry rate in
the supply spilloverscase.
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and it squeezes out other rms in later markets, even in those high revenue markets, as
the market share left for other rms is too small to make prots. The result indicates that
if a policy maker is about to lower entry barriers to encourage entry in an industry with
demand spillovers, he is likely to cultivate monopolists in this industry and induce a lower
entry rate, possibly even lower than in the benchmark case, in future markets.
Conclusion
This paper investigates cost and demand spillovers which determine rm-level
entry decisions in the pharmaceutical industry. In contrast to previous literature which
attributes over-entry in the pharmaceutical industry to supply side spillovers, this paper
nds that demand side spillovers play a signicant role in rm-level entry patterns. The re-
sults show that when demand side spillovers are neglected, the e¤ect of supply side spillovers
tends to be biased upwards. Furthermore, after taking into account both types of spillovers,
the e¤ect of supply side spillovers is negative on average. Ignoring demand side spillovers
leads to misleading results. Particularly, lowering entry barrier increases competition when
supply side spillovers plays its role, but decreases competition when demand side spillovers
are dominant. In addition, supply side spillovers raise social welfare by decreasing average
costs, but the e¤ect of demand side spillovers is ambiguous: market share may be shifted
to more or less productive rms. Subsidizing only new rms is a way to increase competi-
tion when demand side spillovers are signicant. If more rm-level characteristics can be
observed, such as productivity, by the policy maker, he can subsidize more e¢ cient rms
to increase social welfare. In contrast, as only supply side spillovers take e¤ect, the policy
maker does not need to distinguish between rms. Subsidizing all rms can increase social
welfare and competition.
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Appendix
Robustness
Table 4: Posterior Distribution with Supply and Demand Spillovers (with Splited
State-Space)
Parameter 3-rm case
uc 10.7887 (0.3866)
ur 10.6395 ( 0.2389)
c 0.2810 (0.0887)
r 1.5025 (0.0966)
kc -0.0732 (0.0893)
 0.1722 (0.0656)
c 0.8951 (0.1489)
 0.95
pa 0.9375
MCMC Rep 10000
Notes:Table 4 reports the results of estimates after I split the state-space by market revenue. Particularly, I allow the
coe¢ cients of value function V (st) = b + Bst di¤erent when the realized market revenues is above or below their
median revenue. The results show that demand side spillovers still dominate supply side spillovers.
Goodness of t
Table 5.1: Goodness of Fit of Entry
Actual Entry Rate Predicted Entry Rate
Firm 1 45% 37.5%
Firm 2 27.5% 27.5%
Firm 3 25% 22.5%
Notes:Table 5.1 reports the goodness of t of the structural model with demand and supply side spillovers. The second
column is rm-level actual entry rate in all 40 markets. The second column is the predicted rm-level entry rate in
all 40 markets. The predicted entry rate is compute with the posteriors mean of parameters in Table 1 (The third
column).
Table 5.2: Goodness of Fit of Market Revenue
Average Log Actual Revenue Average Log Predicted Revenue
10.4737 (2.1213) 10.2971 (1.6625)
Notes:Table 5.2 reports the mean of actual market revenues and the average predicted market revenues. The standard
deviation is in the parenthesis.
34
CHAPTER III
Firm Selection Across International Markets
This paper uses rich data to re-examine rm-level survival, turnover, and perfor-
mance in a context which is of global interest: the growth of Chinese exports. It is widely
reported that Chinese exports have grown dramatically over the past two decades. The
astonishing size and scope of Chinese export growth have had important economic impacts
worldwide. Numerous developing countries have recommitted to export promotion as a key
plank within their development platform so as to achieve similar growth and success in
international markets. Importing countries have concurrently struggled to determine the
appropriate policy response in the face of large inows of Chinese products. However, little
is known about the micro-economic evolution of rm-level Chinese exporters. Have rapid
increases in rm-level e¢ ciency allowed Chinese exporters to expand across markets world-
wide? Was the rapid expansion of Chinese exports, in contrast, demand driven? Were key
changes to export behavior occurring at the industry or rm-level?
Unfortunately, empirically answering these questions, in any country, is generally
complicated by a lack of adequate data. In particular, most rm-level data sets report total
sales, but do not allow researchers to distinguish between movements in product prices and
quantities. Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) show that revenue based measures of
productivity tend to conate the inuence of both physical productivity and prices on US
rm-behaviour. Likewise, Gervais (2012) argues that among US manufacturers measured
demand-level di¤erences are at least as important in explaining rm-level selection and rev-
enue growth as rm-level productivity. In our context, separately identifying idiosyncratic
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demand and productivity is key to characterizing the nature of rm-selection in interna-
tional markets. Further, most estimates are based on detailed manufacturing data, these
data sets rarely provide any information on the location of sales or the behaviour of man-
ufacturing rms across widely di¤erent markets. Most analyses are restricted to studying
one (the domestic market) or at most a few markets (e.g. domestic vs. export markets).
While a number of key insights have been gained by examining rm-level behaviour within a
small number of markets, these studies generally do not allow us to distinguish how market-
level characteristics inuence the decision enter and maintain a presence in vastly di¤erent
markets.
We are able to shed new insight on rm selection in international markets by
joining two key sources of information. First, we use customs level data containing detailed
information on the price, quantity and destination of the products exported by the universe
of Chinese exporters. Second, the customs data is carefully matched with Chinese rm-level
data describing rm-level inputs and domestic revenue. By separately observing prices and
quantities in export markets we are able to disentangle the di¤erential e¤ects of productivity
and demand on rm-level entry and exit behaviour across worldwide markets. Specically,
we characterize turnover across markets, the persistence in export demand and the selection
of rms across markets in each year between 2002 and 2005.
Our approach follows a long tradition which characterizes industries as collections
of heterogeneous producers with widely di¤erent levels of technological e¢ ciency (e.g. Jo-
vanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson and Pakes (1995), Melitz (2003), and Asplund
and Nocke (2006)). A key feature in each of these models is the strong link between pro-
ducersproductivity levels and their performance in a given market. Further, endogenous
selection mechanisms are often found to drive movements in industry aggregates as market
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shares are reallocated to more e¢ cient producers. Over time less productive plants decline
and exit markets entirely while more e¢ cient plants enter and grow into new markets,
encouraging selection-driven aggregate sales growth across markets.
We nd that export markets are characterized by a very high levels of churning.
Our results suggest that this exit and entry are most closely related to rm-level demand
di¤erences which vary widely across rms. In particular, our calculations suggest that
standard measures of dispersion for demand are several times larger than the same measures
of productivity dispersion. Despite high degrees of international turnover we do not intend
to suggest that the determinants of rm-level entry into export markets vary widely over
time. Rather, almost all of the key determinants of exporting - productivity, prices and
demand- demonstrate very strong degrees of persistence.
There is near universal support for the notion that productivity is a key deter-
minant of export behaviour.1 Likewise, Manova and Zhang (2011, 2012) document large
pricing and quality di¤erences across Chinese exporters and destinations worldwide. Crozet
et al. (2012) document that among French wine producers those that produce high quality
wines export to more markets, charge higher prices, and sell more in each market. We study
to which similar e¤ects are found in the context of Chinese manufacturing and the impact
that demand di¤erences have on aggregate export growth.
An increasing number of papers suggest that demand may play a particularly
important role in determining export decisions and outcomes. A seminal piece studying
rm-level entry to export markets by Das, Roberts and Tybout (1997) argues strongly that
among nearly identical exporters with very similar measures of rm-level e¢ ciency, the set
1Leading examples include Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998), Bernard and Jensen (1999b) and Aw,
Chung and Roberts (2000), among others. Dai et al. (2011) and Lu (2010) both argue the productivity is
strongly associated with rm-level exporting in China, though the two papers dispute the role of productivity
on exporting.
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of export outcomes varies widely. Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2012) and Rho and Ro-
drigue (2012) recently document that export market demand shocks are key determinants
of exporter behaviour in Bangledesh and Indonesia, respectively. In a paper closely related
to ours, Roberts et al. (2012) structurally estimate a model of Chinese footwear exporters.
Analogous to the results in our empirical exercise, they nd that the implied distribution
of demand varies much more than that of productivity. Further, they nd that both pro-
ductivity and demand are strongly associated with export revenues, export market entry
and export frequency. Our results indicate that rm-level demand di¤erences are strong
predictors of annual rm-level market selection, but physical productivity is not.
High rates of turnover in international markets have a large impact on the evolution
of productivity and demand across Chinese exporters. We document that entering and
exiting rms are strongly characterized by very small measures of idiosyncratic demand
relative to incumbent exporters. These di¤erences in demand, in combination with high
rates of churning, appear to have a signicant e¤ect on rm-level pricing. We nd that new
entrants are typically less productive than incumbent exporters and they choose relatively
high prices. Our results suggest that entrants are choosing prices which are on average 12
percent higher than incumbent exporters.
Our results contribute to a series of recent ndings which conrm that the mis-
allocation of resources across rms can have a large impact on aggregate outcomes.2 In
each country in our data, we show that aggregate export growth can be related to changes
in rm-level productivity, changes in rm-level demand and market-specic changes. We
nd that at least 18 percent of short-run export growth (year-to-year) can be attributed
2In particular, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008), and Hsieh and
Klenow (2008) each suggest that selection and resource allocation have important e¤ects on aggregate TFP.
The results mirror ndings from the trade literature which strongly indicate that trade liberalization has led
to substantial resource reallocation and productivity across countries (See, for example, Bernard and Jensen
(1999a) for the US, Pavcnik (2002) on Chile, Treer (2004) on Canada).
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to growth in rm-level demand. In contrast, productivity changes explain at most 5 per-
cent of short-run export growth. In this sense our ndings indicate strong di¤erences in
the margins through which aggregate exports grow. We nd a number of novel ndings
by further decomposing demand and productivity across rms and markets. In particular,
we highlight two mechanisms: the rapid growth of demand among surviving rms and the
short-export spells of rms with low measured demand. The impact of this second e¤ect
should not be underestimated; our estimates suggest that net entry accounts for nearly 60
percent of the total growth in export demand across markets.
This chapter proceeds by outlining a simple model to motivate the empirical exer-
cises that follow. Section 3 describes our data and disentangles our measures productivity
and demand across rms and markets. It also describes the nature of turnover in our data,
the persistence of key rm-level determinants, and documents the association of produc-
tivity and demand with key rm-level export outcomes. The fourth section studies rm
selection in international markets and investigates the role of entry and exit on shaping
the distribution of these characteristics across rms. Section 5 examines aggregate export
growth and decomposes aggregate export growth in two steps. In the rst step we study
the extent to which demand and productivity separately inuence export growth, while in
the second step we decompose each component to study the role of within-rm growth,
reallocation and net entry on the evolution of aggregate demand and productivity among
exporting rms. Section 6 concludes.
A Simple Model of Selection and Exporting
We begin by outlining a model to motivate our empirical work. The model is
purposefully simple and a close variant to those used elsewhere in the trade and indus-
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trial organization literature. In particular, the framework we present below is e¤ectively a
marriage of the trade model in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and its extension in Foster,
Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) which accounts for rm-specic demand.3 Our model
maintains many of the benets of these earlier models. In particular, we will allow rms to
choose to produce in M di¤erent destination markets (as in Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008),
but will characterize their decisions as a function of both rm level productivity, !, and
demand, , (as in Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson, 2008). An important distinction in
our case, however, is that each rm will have a rm-specic demand component in each of
the M markets in which it can enter.
Consider an industry which is comprised of a continuum of producers of measure
N . We index individual producers by i, each of which makes a distinct variety. A fraction
of rms in this industry Nm=N are actively producing for (destination) market m, m =
1; :::;M .4 Each market m is populated by Lm homogeneous consumers who supply 1 unit
of labor each and consume both a homogeneous numeraire good ym and a di¤erentiated
good, qim. Demand for the rms product is captured by the rms residual (inverse)
demand function in market m:
pim = m + im   mqim   mqm
where m > 0, m > 0, and m  0. The variable im is a variety and market-specic
mean-zero taste shifter (i.e. a rm-specic demand shock), qim is the quantity of good
i consumed and qm = N 1m
R
i2I qimdi. The parameter m captures the extent to which
varieties are substitutable for each other in market m; lower values of m induce higher
3Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) e¤ectively considers a closed economy version of Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) where rms di¤er in terms of productivity and demand. While Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) allow for trade across many countries, rms only di¤er in one fundamental dimension, productivity.
4As we describe below a fraction of Ncm=Nm originate in country c = 1; :::;M where we consider each
market a separate country, Nm = N1m + :::+N
M
m .
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degrees of substitutability across varieties. The parameters m and m shift overall demand
for the industry0s output relative to the numeraire, and im shifts demand for particular
goods relative to the level of m.5
Output is produced with a single input xi according to the production function qi =
!ixi where !i is producer-specic productivity. The input can be purchased on competitive
factor markets at a price rc which is constant across producers located in the same country
c, but can vary across countries, c = 1; :::;M . The total cost of production for a rm in
country c is then Cic(qi) = rc!i qi. We assume further that accessing market m is costly.
Specically, in order to sell in market m rms in country c incur iceberg transport costs
 cm  1 per unit shipped from source country c to destination country m. Firm-level
marginal costs of producing and selling a unit in market m are MCimc = rccm!i which vary
across rms located in the same source country c and exporting to the same destination
country m because of rm-level productivity.
Utility and prot maximization jointly imply that the producers optimal price
5The representative consumers preferences over varieties which generates the residual demand function
is given by
Um = ym +
Z
i2I
(m + im)qimdi  1
2
m
Z
i2I
qimdi
2
  1
2
m
Z
i2I
q2imdi
where ym is the quantity of a numeraire good. Consumer utility is composed of three distinct terms. The rst
term is quadratic in total consumption of the industrys output while the second is a term which captures
market-specic tastes for particular varieties. The third term, which enters utility negatively, is increasing in
the variance of consumption across varieties. As m ! 0, only the total taste-adjusted quantity of industry
varieties consumed a¤ects utility. Note that in equilibrium the number of active producers and the average
price level will depend on m.
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and quantity sold in market m are
picm =
1
2

m
mNm + m
m   mNm
mNm + m
m +
mNm
mNm + m
pm + im +
rc cm
!i

(III.1)
qicm =
Lm
2m

m
mNm + m
m   mNm
mNm + m
m +
mNm
mNm + m
pm + im   rc cm
!i

(III.2)
The optimal price is intuitively increasing in the demand for the industrys output, the
average price of competing rms (pm), producer-specic demand and the transport cost
between where the product is produced and the market where it is sold. It is decreasing in
their competitorsaverage quality (m) and productivity since the average industry price is
decreasing in average costs6
pm =
m
mNm + 2m
(m + m) +
mNm + m
mNm + 2m

r cm
!m

Using the equations for optimal price and quantity we can write maximized prots as
icm =
Lm
4m

m
mNm + m
m   mNm
mNm + m
m +
mNm
mNm + m
pm + im   rc cm
!i
2
Following FHS (2008) we dene a market-specic protability index icm = im rc cm=!i.
Firm-level prots imply a critical value of this index, m, where producers with icm < 

m
will not nd operations protable in market m. Solving the optimal prots equation for m
gives us
m =  
m
mNm + m
m +
mNm
mNm + m
m   mNm
mNm + m
pm
A key feature of this index is that it holds for all rms selling in market m regardless of
6The average quality m and the average marginal costs (rm=!m) are functions of the composition of
rms (domestic and exporting rms) which enter into market m.
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whether they reach market m through export or domestic sales. The protability index
generally captures the fact that rms which face higher transport costs are less protable
and, as such, require higher productivity or demand draws to compensate for these costs.7
Although the cuto¤does not directly depend on the size of the market Lm, it does depend on
the number of competitors Nm, which will vary with Lm. We can then rewrite prots for any
rm in any market as icm = Lm4m (icm 

m)
2 and total prots as ic =
P
mmaxf0; icmg.
Free Entry and Equilibrium
A large pool of ex-ante identical potential entrants decide whether to enter the
industry in each country c. They rst choose whether to pay a sunk cost sc in order to
receive demand and productivity draws from a joint distribution with probability density
function f(!; 1; :::; M ). The marginal distributions of ! and m are dened over [!l; !u]
and [ me; me], respectively, where me < m and !l > 0. If they choose to receive draws,
they then determine whether to begin production, which markets to serve and earn the
corresponding prots. A free-entry condition pins down the equilibrium values m in each
market. Specically, the (1; :::; 

M ) must set the net expected value of entry into the
industry by rms in each country equal to zero. That is, m must satisfy
V Ec =
Z
!
Z
1
:::
Z
M
ic(i1; :::iM ; 

1; :::; 

M )f(!; 1; :::; M )dM ; :::; d1d!   sc = 0
The above expression summarizes the industry equilibrium. It combines the con-
dition that producers only enter markets where they make non-negative prots with the
condition which species that entry occurs until the expected value of the rm is zero. The
7This index also allows for the possibility that the domestic market is more competitive than some
export markets. As argued by Lu (2010), in many industries Chinese exporters are less productive than
their non-exporting counterparts. Dai et al. (2011) argue that this nding in Lu (2010) is feature of sample
construction. We take no stand on the issue here as we will not be directly comparing exporting and
non-exporting rms but simply note that our model allows for this possibility.
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equilibrium requires that successful producers receive large enough idiosyncratic productiv-
ity and demand draws to meet the protability thresholds. As such, the model suggests
that demand and productivity jointly determine entry and survival across markets.
Measures of Productivity and Demand
We consider a number of di¤erent measures of productivity and demand in our
empirical exercise. These have a close relationship with those specied in our simple model.
Our rst productivity measure, often called physical productivity (TFPQ) is based on
quantities of physical output:
TFPQi =
qi
xi
=
!ixi
xi
= !i (III.3)
The second productivity measure, typically referred to as revenue productivity (TFPR), is
based on producer revenue.
TFPRi =
piqi
xi
= pi!i =
1
2
mm
mNm + m
!i+
1
2
mNm
mNm + m
(pm m)!i+ 1
2
im+
1
2
rc cm
(III.4)
The key di¤erence between these two measures of productivity is that revenue productivity
captures uctuation in e¢ ciency and prices, while physical productivity ideally captures
variation in e¢ ciency alone.
Discussion
Our model, though simple, provides us with a number of key implications about
the relationship between exogenous parameters and the equilibrium cuto¤protability level.
These in turn provide us with a sense of how entry and exit patterns will vary across prod-
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ucts and countries. The rst result pertains to the relationship between iceberg trade costs
and the equilibrium cuto¤ m. We nd that a decrease in iceberg trade costs, say through
trade liberalization or improvements in shipping technology, unambiguously increases the
equilibrium protability cuto¤, @

m
@cm
< 0. This implies that as trade costs fall relatively
unprotable rms - rms with low productivity or demand - will struggle to survive in
equilibrium. Similarly, it is straightforward to show that in industries where individual
varieties are stronger substitutes for each other will also be characterized by higher equi-
librium cuto¤ values, @

m
@m
< 0. Again, this result is hardly surprising. If consumers are
less able to substitute away from a given product, producers with less appealing products
or higher costs are implicitly protected from being driven out of business by high-demand
and/or low-cost competitors. Intuitively we expect that industries which produce more
homogeneous products will typically be characterized by a lower value of m and, as such,
have higher equilibrium protability cuto¤s, ceteris paribus.8
Our simple results provide insight into the nature of selection across markets and
time. First, rm selection depends on rm-specic, market-specic and trade-specic fac-
tors. The model shows that rm-level outcomes will vary with rm-level productivity and
demand in all markets. Although revenue-based TFP measures are positively correlated
with true productivity, they also confound idiosyncratic demand with e¢ ciency. This sug-
gests that the impact of productivity on market entry and turnover may vary substantially
with measurement. Second, shifts in market and industry conditions a¤ect the margins
along which selection occurs across heterogeneous producers. Last, selection varies directly
8These results are very small extensions of those already shown in the literature. The rst is an extension
of that already shown in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) extended to a model with idiosyncratic demand and
productivity shocks. As such, we relegate further discussion and the proofs to the Supplemental Appendix.
The second is the same result presented in Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) extended to a multi-
country setting. Due to the separability of markets in our model, the proof is essentially identical to that in
Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008). We refer the interested reader to their 2005 NBER working paper
for details.
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with trade costs and the size of trading economies.
Data and Measurement
Our objective is to characterize the nature of rm-level selection across countries
using rm and product level data from China. To accomplish this goal we match two key
sources of information. First, we use data on the universe of Chinese rms that participated
in international trade over the 2002-2005 period. These data have been collected by the
Chinese Customs O¢ ce and report the f.o.b.value of rm exports in U.S. dollars across
destination countries and products in the Chinese eight-digit Harmonized System. The
data set also provides information about the quantities traded.9 The level of detail in the
customs data is an important feature in the construction of export prices and quantities
because they are not contaminated by aggregation across rms or markets. Further, we
will exploit this key feature in order to capture a measure of rm-product-level e¢ ciency
which will not reect movements in export prices (as with revenue productivity) or the
aggregation of di¤erent prices across markets or time.
The customs data is carefully matched with annual rm-level data from the Chi-
nese manufacturing sector. Specically, we use annual rm-level data for the period 2000-
2007 on all industrial rms that are identied as being either state-owned, or are non-
state-owned rms with sales above 5 million RMB. These data come from annual surveys
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). In aggregate, the data cover an
unbalanced panel of manufacturing rms that increases in size from 162,883 rms in 2000
9In general, each product is recorded in a single unit of measurement. The number of distinct product
codes in the Chinese eight-digit HS classication is similar to that in the 10-digit HS trade data for the
United States.
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to 336,768 rms in 2007.10 The rm-level data include detailed information on rm-level
revenues, export sales, intermediate materials, employment, wages, capital stock, ownership
and industry classication.
The Matching Process
Matching the rm-level data with the corresponding customs data is a key step
in our empirical exercise. Both sets of data contain rm-identiers which allow us to track
rms over time in either data set. Unfortunately, di¤erent rm-identiers are used in each
data set which prevents us from using this natural metric to match rms to export products.
Instead, we rely on reported plant-specic location and communication information
contained in both data sets. Specically, both data sets provide detailed information on
the location of the plant of origin (a disaggregated area code) and the plants primary
telephone number. Our matching algorithm searches for plants in both data sets which
consistently report the same area code and phone numbers over time. Any export product
and rm which are associated with consistent location and telephone number information
are included in our matched sample. Nonetheless, for many rms/export records we are not
able to nd any suitable match. In total we are able match 21,621 rms across data sets.
This accounts for approximately one quarter of all Chinese exporters in the customs data.
The relatively small number of matches occur for a number of plausible reasons.
First, a number of our records report the same phone numbers (the same last 4 digits)
in the same area code, but are associated with di¤erent rm-level identiers. This a¤ects
roughly 3.5 and 7 percent of observations in the rm-level and customs data, respectively.
10The unit of observation is the rm, and not the plant. Sales of 5 million RMB roughly translate to
$US 600,000 over this period. During this period manufacturing prices were relatively stable. Brandt, van
Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012) suggest that nearly 95 percent of all observations in a very similar sample are
single-plant rms.
47
We eliminate all of the records associated with these rm identiers before matching the
remaining data. Second, our rm-level data only captures relatively large rms. Because
of this we often cannot match small exporters in the customs data with any record in the
rm-level data. Third, we cannot match many rms which report more than one plant or
more than one phone number. Nonetheless, we are condent that our matched sample is
strongly comparable to the sample of Chinese manufacturing exporters from the rm-level
data set.
We conduct a number of tests to study the composition of exports across products
and rms in both the matched sample and the rm-level data. In each case we nd that
the two samples are very similar. For instance, Figure 1 presents the distribution of export
revenues across rms the rm-level data and the matched sample. We observe that the
distribution of exports across rms is nearly identical in the matched and full sample of
rms.11 Likewise, Table 1 reports the percentage of exports for 10 specic manufacturing
products on which we focus our later analysis in both the (full) rm-level data set and our
matched sample. In each case, the mean percentage of sales from exports are relatively
close.
Rules for Inclusion in the Sample
Our data is very rich, but we need to make a number of restrictions on the set
of rms we include in our nal sample. First, we choose to focus on specic products.
Although this greatly reduces our sample size, it has a number of important benets. In
particular, we are able to exploit our highly disaggregated information on exports without
11We note that the right tail of the export revenue distribution is slightly thicker in the matched sample
possibly capturing that larger, more established rms are more likely to present consistent location and
telephone number information over time.
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having to worry about aggregation bias across multiple products within the same industry.
We choose to focus on ten distinct products. The rst ve products are chosen because they
are arguably relatively homogeneous products: plywood, inorganic salt, iron alloys, dyestu¤
and silk fabric. This choice is made specically to avoid large quality variation in producers
physical outputs and allows us to highlight the quantity-versus-revenue distinction that is
otherwise confounded in the literature. The second set of products are purposefully chosen
to represent industries where di¤erent varieties are likely to represent very di¤erent levels
of quality. By including these industries we can then compare how our results change when
we examine a set of highly di¤erentiated industries and consider the role that di¤erentiation
may play in determining demand and productivity measurement across rms.12
Second, we impose a product specialization criterion: a rm must obtain at least
50% of its export revenue from sales of our export of interest. The purpose of this restriction
is to reduce measurement problems in calculating physical TFP. As is common in most
rm-level data sets, factor inputs are reported at the rm-level rather than by product. By
focusing on highly specialized exporters we minimize the degree of measurement error in
productivity arising from di¤erences in product scope across rms. Table 1.1 presents the
number of observations for each product in each year.
Variable Construction
In this section we briey summarize the construction of key variables. Full details
are provided in the Appendix. We rst calculate the average export price for each product
12We check that the products we describe as undi¤erentiated and di¤erentiated satisfy Rauch (1999)
classication of undi¤erentiated or di¤erentiated products. An additional advantage of choosing ten specic
products is that it is straightforward to verify whether there has been any trade disputes associated with
these Chinese exports. While a number of our products have been subject to trade disputes in recent years,
none of our products are subject to WTO action during our sample period.
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in each year using a revenue-weighted geometric mean. Observed export prices and revenues
are converted to a common year using the average annual price as a deator. Annual values
are calculated as quantity weighted averages over each calendar year.
Real intermediate materials are constructed by deating nominal intermediate
materials with the Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012) benchmark intermediate
input deators. Real capital stock is constructed using book values in 2000, nominal new
investment each year and the Brandt-Rawski investment deators for China. We employ
the perpetual inventory method, under the assumption that current investment becomes
productive next year, to construct an annual series of capital holdings for each rm, ki;t+1 =
(1  d)kit + iit where d is the depreciation rate.13
We calculate the materials share as the average share of intermediate inputs in total
revenues. The labor share is calculated analogously with the exception that we follow Hsieh
and Klenow (2008) to adjust the reported wage bill to account for unreported employee
compensation. Similarly, in the absence of reliable capital share information we follow
Hsieh and Klenow (2008) and assume constant returns to scale so that k = 1   l   m.
We have alternatively tried estimating the input shares, and productivity, using control
function methods (Olley and Pakes, 1996). We nd very similar measures of input shares
and productivity. Moreover, our later results are all una¤ected by this change.
Last, we need to apportion inputs in a fashion to account for multi-product rms.
We do this as in Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008). For each rm we rst calculate
the percentage of total revenues from the primary export in each year, %it. Then for any
input variable (capital, intermediate materials, labor) we calculate the total amount of each
13For our main results we use the total wage bill to measure the quality-adjusted labor stock for each
rm. We have alternatively tried constructing productivity using the number of employees as our measure
of employment. Since this di¤erence had virtually no e¤ect on any of our results, we omit further results
and discussion from the main text.
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input xit allocated to the production of the primary export as xit = %it~xit where ~xit is the
total amount of input used in rm i in year t.14
Measuring Productivity
Our primary measure of total factor productivity is
lnTFPQit = ln qit   k ln kit   l ln lit   m lnmit
where qit is the physical units of output of rm is primary export in year t across desti-
nations. Similarly, k, l and m represent the rm-product measures of capital, labor and
materials, respectively, and k, l and m capture each inputs share parameter.
Numerous papers studying the selection of rms into export markets have relied
exclusively on revenue based measures of productivity. For purposes of comparability we
also compute a measure of revenue based productivity as
lnTFPRit = ln qitpit   k ln kit   l ln lit   m lnmit
where pit is the rms (deated) export price.
Variation in TFPQ generally reects di¤erences in physical e¢ ciency and, possi-
bly, factor input prices. In general, it captures some measure of the producers average unit
cost. The revenue based productivity measure captures both variation in physical e¢ ciency
and logged output prices. Prices, not surprisingly, vary widely in our data set since our ex-
porting rms choose very di¤erent prices across locations and time. As such, we expect that
14De Loecker et al. (2012) estimate the input share across product for multi-product rms. They nd that
input allocations across products are highly correlated with allocating inputs according to product revenue
shares. We cannot follow their procedure since we do not have product-level information for domestic sales.
However, since our sample is composed of rms which are specialized in the production of one product this
e¤ect should be very small.
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each variable will have a similar, but not necessarily identical, impact on rm behaviour.
Measuring Demand
We seek to separate the inuence of demand and productivity on rm-level entry
behaviour and study the impact of both on rm sorting across markets and export growth.
We rst consider a measure of market based demand consistent with our simple model.
For robustness, we also use a simple empirical model to develop an alternative measure of
demand shocks consistent with an iso-elastic demand curve.
Measure 1: Linear Demand
Our model suggests that total demand in market m for rm is product in period
t is qimt = Cmt + Lmm imt  
Lm
m
pimt where Cmt is a collection of market and time specic
constants. Rearranging terms we write
vimt  pimt + mqimt
Lm
=
mCmt
Lm
+ imtx
If we knew the true values of m and Lm then we can calculate vimt. An OLS regression
of vimt on a set of market-specic time dummies, mt, and a set of rm-market specic
dummies, uim
vimt = mt + u
L
im + ~u
L
imt (III.5)
reveals the rm-market-year specic component of the demand shock, ~uLimt. Using the resid-
uals from the above regression, ~^uLimt, we can construct a measure of rm-specic demand,
uLimt = ^uim + ~^uimt.
To operationalize our strategy we make three mild assumptions. First, we assume
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that we can proxy market size, Lm, by real GDP for each country in the initial year of our
sample, Lm = L ln(GDPm).
15 Second, we will need to assume that m is constant across
markets m   (though we will allow it to vary across products). Last, we need a measure
of m. We will likewise assume that transport costs are proportional to log distance,16
m =  ln(DISTANCEm). The coe¢ cients L and  are additional parameters we will
need to estimate.
The ratio of sales by rm i to any two markets m and m0 can then be written
qimt
qim0t
=
Lm
Lm0
 
pimt   rm!it
pim0t   rm0!it
!
=
ln(GDPm)
ln(GDPm0)
 
pimt    ln(DISTANCEm)!it
pim0t    ln(DISTANCEm0 )!it
!
Rearranging terms we can identify a value for  for any rm that exports to at least two
locations
im;m
0
 =
!it(qimt  ln(GDPm0) pim0t   qim0t  ln(GDPm) pimt)
qimt  ln(GDPm0) ln(DISTANCEm0)  qim0t  ln(GDPm) ln(DISTANCEm)
We estimate  for each product as the simple mean from the data ^ =
1
~N
P
i
P
t
P
m6=m0 
im;m0

where ~N is the number of distinguishable within-rm country pairs in the data and rc has
been normalized to 1.
Using equations (III.1)-(III.2) we then write
 =
Lm
qimt

pimt   rm
!imt

) 
L
=
ln(GDPm)
qimt

pimt    ln(DISTANCEm)
!imt

We pin down the ratio of  to L as
\ 
L

=
1
N
X
i
X
c
X
t
ln(GDPm)
qimt
 
pimt   ^ ln(DISTANCEm)
!imt
!
where N is the total number of observations in the industry over all years and destinations.
15The variable GDPm is measured as real GDP (constant prices). The data is sourced from the Penn
World Tables.
16The distance variable is calculated as the air distance between Beijing and each destination countrys
capital city. The distance data are obtained from CEPII, available at www.cepii.fr.
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Given our estimate of the ratio cL we can compute the LHS of (III.5) for each observation
as
v^imt = pimt +
\ 
L

qimt
ln(GDPm)
We repeat this exercise separately for each product and construct a measure of v^imt, and
thus demand, for each observation in our data.
Measure 2: Iso-elastic Demand
Although the above method corresponds to our model, it requires a number of
strong assumptions on Lm,  and m. Below we discuss an alternative measure of market-
specic demand. Although it is not strictly consistent with our model, the second de-
mand measure is consistent with an iso-elastic demand function, a common feature of many
modern trade models. Our demand estimation methodology here follows those in Foster,
Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) and Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2009), but
allows for features that are unique to our setting. Specically, we begin by considering the
following simple regression of rm-level demand
ln qimt = 0 + 1 ln pimt + jmt + ijm + imt
where i, j, m and t index rms, product groups, destination markets and time, respectively.
The vectors jmt and ijm collect product-market-year specic variables and rm-product-
market variables which a¤ect export demand, respectively, while imt is an error term.
We begin by taking rst di¤erences to eliminate the time-invariant component of
demand.
 ln qimt = 1 ln pimt +jmt +imt (III.6)
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We allow for each market in each year to receive a demand shock unique to their market.
As discussed in Manova and Zhang (2012) export prices often reect destination market
di¤erences in size, income, distance and isolation. The product-market-year xed e¤ects
control for both time-invariant and time-varying xed e¤ects in each product market.17
Finally, we expect that if there is a positive demand shock (a large imt) this is
likely to be reected in higher prices, p, and sales, q. To account for possible endogeneity
bias we estimate equation (III.6) by IV. As argued in Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson
(2008), Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2009) and Gervais (2012) a natural instru-
ment for output prices in this context is our measure of rm-level physical productivity. As
we demonstrate below, our measure of physical productivity is strongly, negatively corre-
lated with prices even though it was not constructed using any output price information.
Moreover, our measure of physical productivity should capture shocks to rm-costs and are
arguably uncorrelated with market-specic demand shocks. We proceed by using changes
in the log physical productivity to instrument for changes in log prices.
Estimating equation (III.6) by IV we nd that the estimate of 1 is  3:1. If we
were to interpret these as the elasticities in a CES demand framework, we would compute
rm-level markups in our data to be in the range of 45 to 48 percent. These results are
broadly in line with those found in other countries, markets and estimation methods.18 We
then construct the iso-elastic measure of export demand, uIimt, as the estimated di¤erence
between observed sales and the price e¤ect, lnuIijmt = ln qijmt   ^1 ln pijmt.
Sample Properties
17Our data captures nearly 200 distinct destination countries.
18See Table 1.2 for estimation results. See Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008), Eslava, Haltiwanger,
Kugler and Kugler (2009), De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) for further discussion and citations.
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Sample Correlations
Table 1.3 collects correlations and standard deviations for each of the core variables
of our study. Specically, we document summary statistics for our two measures of rm
exports (log physical units sold and log revenue), our two measures of productivity (TFPQ
and TFPR), our two measures of product-market-time specic demand shocks (uL and
uI), log price and the log of capital. We remove product-market-year xed e¤ects from
each variable so that product-market heterogeneity or aggregate intertemporal shocks do
not drive our results.
The rst point we wish to make is that the measures of exports (physical units
shipped and export revenue), productivity (TFPQ and TFPR), and demand (linear and
iso-elastic) are, in general, highly correlated. The correlation between physical and revenue
sales reects the wide dispersion in rm-level heterogeneity within industries as evidenced
by the large standard deviations for each of these measures. Second, we also observe that
our two measures of total factor productivity are also positively correlated with each other,
but this correlation is relatively weak (approximately 0.2). This is hardly surprising; het-
erogeneous exporters vary substantially in their location, duration and size of export sales.
The positive, but weak, correlation between physical and revenue based productivity sug-
gests that quantitative results based on revenue-based measures of productivity have the
potential to be misleading. Third, it is encouraging that our two measures of demand (lin-
ear and iso-elastic) are highly correlated. Either measure of demand suggests a much larger
degree of dispersion in demand relative to rm-level productivity.
Firm-level prices are negatively correlated with physical productivity, suggesting
that more productive Chinese exporters tend to charge lower prices in export markets.
Despite wide price dispersion across producers, the negative covariance between prices and
56
physical productivity causes the dispersion of revenue productivity to be smaller than that
of physical productivity. Perhaps surprisingly, prices are also strongly negatively correlated
with our measures of demand, though this correlation is substantially weaker than the
correlation with physical productivity or physical exports. As we explore below, we nd
that this result is largely due to exceptionally high turnover in export markets.19
Export Sales, Entry and Frequency
We observe large rm-level di¤erences in both measures of demand and produc-
tivity. What is less obvious from our preceding decomposition, however, is the extent to
which these are related to export performance. We begin by studying the impact of demand
and productivity on key export outcomes: export sales, export frequency and the number
of active export markets.
To keep our exercise simple, and easy to read in 2-dimensional space, we make a
number of simplifying transformations of the data. First, we normalize rm-specic physical
productivity by subtracting the product-specic average productivity from each variable and
dividing the di¤erence by standard deviation of product-specic physical productivity. We
repeat this normalization exercise for demand, except, in this second case, the normalization
is rm-and-market specic since we observe a demand shock for each market a rm enters.
To develop a measure of rm-specic, rather than rm-market specic demand, we take the
simple average over all markets the rm entered in each year. The idea is to roughly measure
whether a rm generally nds itself in the upper or lower part of the demand distribution
across markets. We then renormalize our measure of rm-specic demand so that both
normalized demand and productivity have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of
19A similar table examining rst-di¤erences in key variables can be found in the Supplemental Appendix.
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one. Last, we use a exible specication (fractional polynomials) to regress the resulting
distributions of rm-specic productivity and demand against the log of each rms total
export sales in the same year.
Figure 2 plots the estimated relationship between productivity or demand and
total rm-level export sales. We nd that export sales are strongly increasing in both
productivity and demand. Under the admittedly strong assumption that the demand shocks
in each market are independent of each other, our normalization will equalize the standard
deviation of both productivity and demand. The slope of each line (productivity or demand)
is suggestive of each components individual relationship with export sales. We observe that
the slope of the demand curve is steeper than the productivity curve almost everywhere.
Figure 3 plots a similar relationship between productivity, demand and the fre-
quency of exporting. Likewise, Figure 4 captures the relationship between productiv-
ity/demand and the number of active export markets. The dependent variable in this
exercise is the number of distinct countries to which the rm exports in a given year. Ex-
port frequency and the number of export markets are both clearly positively associated
with productivity and demand. Again, casual observation, though hardly conclusive, would
suggest that a one standard deviation increase in demand may potentially have a substan-
tially larger impact on entry or export frequency than a one standard deviation increase in
productivity.
Turnover in International Markets
We document entry and exit rates across international markets in Table 1.4.
Among Chinese rms which export to any market in any year nearly 53 percent did not ex-
port to that market in the previous year. Likewise, among rms exporting to a given market
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this year 40 percent will exit that market in the following year. These rates are extremely
high relative to those commonly cited in domestic markets, even for China. For instance,
we calculate that the average domestic market entry and exit rate among all manufacturing
rms in China as 25 and 18 percent, respectively.20
Table 1.4 also presents mean entry and exit rates across broad regions worldwide.
Entry and exit appear to be strongly correlated worldwide; markets with the highest entry
rates also tend to display the highest exit rates. Regions with higher average incomes tend
to display markedly less churning. This potentially indicates that export entry in smaller
and less developed markets is of shorter duration.
Persistence
Above we observed extremely high rates of international turnover. Despite this,
numerous papers demonstrate strong persistence in many of the determinants of rm-level
behaviour. In particular, conditional on survival, productivity, demand and prices have
been shown to be strongly persistent in both domestic and international markets.21 We
briey re-examine these ndings with three small, but important di¤erences: i) we study
the extent to which using physical TFP in place of revenue based TFP changes our estimates
of productivity persistence, ii) we study di¤erences in the evolution of export demand across
broad regions worldwide and iii) we study di¤erences in the persistence across productivity
and demand.
Consider a determinant ximt which is rm, market and year-specic (e.g. demand).
20These calculations are made using the rm-level data described in Section 3. They may be biased
downwards since the rm-level data only covers relatively large rms. Note, however, that this same bias
would be true of our matched sample.
21See Supina and Roberts (1996), Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992), Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan
(2001), Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007), Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) and Aw, Roberts and
Xu (2012) among others.
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A natural starting point for determining the persistence rates in this measure would be the
OLS regression of a simple AR(1) model
ximt = xim;t 1 + imt (III.7)
where imt is an iid error term. Unfortunately, a selection issue arises because many of
the rms which export to market m in year t  1 will not export to that market in year t.
Further, we suspect, and conrm below, that exiting rms systematically di¤er from those
that survive to the next period. Since we cannot recover ximt for the exiting rms, our
estimate of  is likely to be accordingly biased.
To account for this potential source of bias, we use a simple rst stage selection
correction to control for endogenous exit. We include last years observed demand, produc-
tivity and market characteristics as explanatory and use the predicted probabilities from
the selection regressions to form the inverse Mills ratio. We include the inverse Mills ratio as
an additional regressor in the estimation of equation (III.7). Standard errors are obtained
by bootstrapping rms over both steps of this procedure. We discuss the nature of rm
selection at length in the next Section.22 Instead, for now, we focus on the persistence
parameters for demand, productivity, prices and revenues reported in Table 1.5. In each
case, we observe that the determinants of trade are strongly persistent over time. Revenue
TFP appears slightly more persistent than physical TFP. The annual autocorrelation coef-
cient on physical TFP is 0.89 while the estimated autocorrelation coe¢ cient is nearly 1 for
revenue TFP. This suggests that price responses to temporal productivity shocks mitigate
changes in revenue-based productivity. Both measures of demand are strongly persistent
though the linear demand measure is markedly more persistent across years than our mea-
22It is unclear how measure export demand across all markets since some rms export to more destinations
than others. To simplify our problem we capture lagged aggregate export demand across all destinations as
uLi;t 1 =
P
m u^
L
im;t 1 and include this as a rst stage regressor.
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sure of iso-elastic demand. Given the observed persistence in productivity and demand, it
is not surprising that revenue and prices also reect a high degree of persistence over time
with estimated autocorrelation coe¢ cients above 0.91.
Dynamics in International Markets
This section investigates two salient features of rm behaviour in international
markets. We rst study the role of rm-level characteristics, namely productivity and
demand, in determining rm selection across international markets. We document the im-
portance of both rm-level characteristics and market-specic features. Second, we examine
the rm-level di¤erences across entering, exiting and incumbent exporters. In markets with
a high degree turnover, the entry and exit behaviour of heterogeneous exporters plays an
important role in determining the evolution of the distribution of productivity and demand.
These, in turn, a¤ect the growth of aggregate exports.
Selection Dynamics
In this section we explore the role of productivity and demand on rm survival
across markets worldwide and evaluate the extent to which each of these determinants has
a signicant impact on rm exit decisions. We consider annual logit exit regressions where
we regress an indicator for rms decision to exit market m in year t+1 on our measures of
producers idiosyncratic characteristics and destination-specic variables. Specically, let
Dim;t+1 be a binary variable which takes a value of 1 if a year t exporter to market m stops
exporting to the same market in year t+ 1. We can then write the logit equation as
E(Dim;t+1 = 1jXimt) = [1 + expf (0 +Ximt + i + t)g] 1:
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where Ximt includes key explanatory variables such as productivity, demand, destination
market-size (proxied by real GDP) and distance from the destination countrys capital city
and Beijing (all in logarithms). We also consider specications which include a number of
additional rm-specic variables, such as: rm age, rm capital and the log of the average
import price. The log average import price is often used as a measure of input quality
(e.g. See Manova and Zhang, 2012). Since nearly all of our exporting rms in the matched
sample import at least one input, we are able to study the extent to which this measure
captures the same heterogeneity as our demand measures. For instance, Gervais (2012)
constructs very similar demand measures, but refers to them as product quality. Here, we
can directly examine whether there is additional variation in import prices which is not
captured by our demand residuals. Last, i and t are vectors of rm and time dummies,
respectively. The rm xed e¤ects are of particular importance in this context: it is widely
reported that there exists important rm-level di¤erences in access to credit, government
subsidies and export licenses in the Chinese manufacturing sector. Each of these are likely
to a¤ect rm-level exit decisions. Including rm-level xed e¤ect allows us to control for
these unobserved time-invariant di¤erences across rms.23
Table 2 presents the impact of each explanatory variable on rm exit decisions
when we pool all of our data. The rst ve columns of the top panel study the individual
e¤ect of productivity, demand and prices on exit. Productivity, revenue or physical, is found
to deter exit, although this e¤ect is only statistically signicant for revenue productivity.
Higher demand is always found to discourage exit, while prices do not have any statistically
signicant e¤ect when we study their individual impact. Columns 6 and 7 examine the
joint impact of productivity and demand, while columns 8 and 9 add other key rm-level
23Conditional MLE estimation under the above specication is discussed in detail by Wooldridge (2002),
Chapter 15.
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determinants: age, log capital, and the log import price. In each case, we observe that
productivity never has a statistically signicant e¤ect on exit, while higher demand is con-
sistently estimated to strongly discourage exit at standard levels of statistical signicance.
Among the additional rm-level variables, only age is estimated to have a statistically sig-
nicant impact; younger rms are more likely to exit export markets relative to older,
established incumbent exporters. The last two rows of each column present the impact of
market-specic measures on rm exit. Not surprisingly, we consistently nd that Chinese
exporters are less likely to exit large markets and markets which are closer in distance.
We check the robustness of our results by splitting our sample in a number of in-
teresting dimensions. First, Table 2.1 examines the same regressions across di¤erent types
of rms ownership (private, foreign, state), the type of trade (ordinary trade, processing
trade) and product di¤erentiation.24 We nd that our results hold broadly across di¤erent
types of rms, the nature of trade and across product di¤erentiation. In particular, pro-
ductivity is never found to be a signicant determinant of rm selection. Firm demand, in
contrast, is almost always a highly signicant determinant of export market selection.
Evolution of Key Distributions
As a rst step in studying the role of rm selection in export markets on macro
outcomes we document di¤erences in key variables across entering, continuing, and exiting
rms. We compute these di¤erences by regressing each of the key rm level measures
(productivity, demand, prices, revenue) on entry and exit dummies and a complete set
of product-by-year-by-market xed e¤ects. Specically, let ximt be a rm-market specic
24It is natural to expect that export relationships may vary across ownership and products. For example,
to export from China each rm must rst acquire an export license. It is well-known that there have strong
institutional preferences to allocate licenses di¤erentially across Chinese manufacturing rms. It is widely
reported that privately owned rms are far less likely to be given export licenses relative to state-owned
rms.
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variable (e.g. demand), letDEimt be an entry dummy variable and letD
X
imt be an exit dummy
variable. At the annual level, the entry dummy for year t equals one if the rm enters market
m between year t  1 and t. Likewise, the exit dummy equals one if the rm exits market
m sometime between t and t+1. The product-year-market dummies capture the evolution
of continuing (or incumbent) rms. The coe¢ cient on the entry (or exit) dummy measures
the average log point di¤erence between the determinant of interest among entering (or
exiting) rms and incumbent producers in export markets. Our regression is written as
ximt = 0 + ED
E
imt + XD
X
imt + jmt + imt
where jmt is a collection of product-market-year dummies and ijmt is the iid error term.
The coe¢ cients E and X capture the average di¤erence in ximt for entering and exiting
rms, respectively, relative to incumbents.
The rst two rows of Table 3 present the coe¢ cients on the entry and exit variables
in our regressions. Whether or not we conclude that new exporters are more productive
than incumbent exporters in the same market depends heavily on our measurement of
productivity. Our estimates imply that new exporters are 3 percent more productive than
incumbent exporters if we use the revenue based measure of productivity. In contrast, if
we use our measure of physical productivity we nd exactly the opposite: new exporters
are 3 percent less productive than incumbent exporters. Among exiting rms we nd
that productivity is 3.4 percent higher than that of incumbent exporters. The puzzling
positive coe¢ cient on the physical TFP of exiting rms can largely be attributed to capacity
constraints among growing rms. In particular, once we condition on existing capital stock
(or capital-intensity) we nd no signicant productivity di¤erence between exiting and
incumbent exporters.25
25We omit the results using capital-intensity since they are very similar.
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The di¤erences between the physical and revenue based productivity coe¢ cients
among entering rms can largely be explained by pricing behavior. New entrants generally
choose high prices; the annual results in Table 3 imply that new entrants are charging prices
which are 12 percent higher than incumbent rms. This aspect of rm behaviour can be
rationalized by the fact that new exporters are likely to be high cost (low productivity)
producers relative to incumbent exporters.
Regardless of how we measure productivity, these di¤erences are much smaller than
the observed di¤erences in demand. Rather, we nd that entering rms have demand shocks
which are 55 to 66 percent smaller than incumbent rms. Our coe¢ cients further imply
that the demand among exiting rms is estimated to be 18 to 39 percent smaller annually.
Taken together with the estimated coe¢ cients on the entry dummy, we observe that the
high turnover of rms in international markets likely reects a recycling of rms with low
demand shocks in export markets. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 document the results across product
di¤erentiation, high-and-low productivity rms, and rm-type (private rms engaged in
ordinary trade, private rms engaged in processing trade, foreign-owned rms and state-
owned rms). We observe that the same qualitative patterns arise in almost every case.26
Sources of Aggregate Export Growth
It is widely reported that Chinese exports have grown dramatically over the past
two decades. Even in our short sample, this pattern is striking; in many export markets we
observe that aggregate exports are 4 or 5 times larger in 2005 than they were in 2002. Little
is known, however, regarding the di¤erential contributions of demand and productivity to
Chinese export growth. We rst decompose annual changes of real export sales into changes
26The sole exception is the coe¢ cients on entrant productivity for foreign-owned rms.
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in aggregate physical productivity and aggregate demand. Then, we further decompose
each individual aggregate component (productivity and demand) to determine the extent
to which each of these (growth in demand and growth in productivity) can be attributed
to within-rm growth or reallocation across rms.
We calculate the weighted average rm-level exports in each product market as
QLmt =
P
i imtqimt where qimt is the quantity of rm is exports to market m in year t and
imt =
qimtP
i qimt
is rm is market share of exports to market m in year t. Our model implies
that the quantity sold by rm i in market m can be written as
qimt =
Lm
2m

~CLmt + imt   rm~!it

where we maintain the assumption that m = , collect market-product-year specic e¤ects
which are constant across rms in a given year as ~CLmt, and to simplify notation we write
productivity e¤ects as ~!it = 1!it .
27 We have model-consistent measures of imt, ~!imt and
rm from our preceding work. Inserting the individual demand function into the aggregate
export growth equation gives us
QLmt =
Lm
2m

DLimt   ^ ln(DISTANCEm)
Lit + ~CLmt

where DLimt =
P
i imtimt, 

L
imt =
P
i imt~!it and Q
L
mt = Q
L
mt  QLm;t 1. The rst quan-
tities of interest for the decomposition exercise correspond to the percentage of aggregate
export growth QLmt which can be attributed to aggregate demand growth D
L
imt and cost
27The market-product-year specic e¤ects which are constant across rms in a given year are ~CLmt =

mNmt+
m   mNmtmNmt+ mt +
mNmt
mNmt+
pmt:
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reductions/productivity growth, 
Limt, respectively. That is, we want to compute
Demand Contribution =
DLimt
 ~QLimt
Productivity Contribution =  ^ ln(DISTANCEm)

Limt
 ~QLimt
where ~QLimt = 2Q
L
imt
\ 
L ln(GDP )

. These ratios capture the fraction of aggregate export
growth which is attributable to demand or productivity growth in each market.
Because our level decomposition exercise uses the level of exports, productivity
and demand, it may be highly inuenced by outlier observations. Specically, given that
we examine over 200 distinct markets, some of which are very small, large demand outliers
may play an inordinately large role in the magnitude of our ndings. To control for this
e¤ect we drop the top and bottom 5 percent of all of the linear demand observations in
each market. We then take a simple average of the contributions over the nearly 200 export
markets and report our results in the top panel of Table 4.
We nd three striking results. First, Chinese exports were growing extremely
quickly over our sample period. The annual average export growth across all markets was
almost 55 percent per year. Second, year-to-year productivity changes contribute almost
nothing to these short-run aggregate export ows. Although the evolution of productivity,
and its interaction with trade, has received notable attention in recent literature, we caution
that it would be surprising to nd a large contribution from productivity changes in our
context. Specically, given the short time period we study and the relatively long time it
takes to develop, install and implement technological improvements it would surprising if
the productivity contribution were large.28 Third, changes in rm-level demand explain
18 percent of the aggregate export growth (the remaining export growth is attributed to
28For example, it is common to assume that it takes a year to install new capital equipment in rm-level
data. We are not likely to observe many large changes in rm-level technology over our four-year sample.
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market-product-year xed e¤ects). Across all markets, the component of demand which
applies equally to all rms in a given product market is increasing in most export markets.
Remarkably, the same pattern emerges in almost all markets, and across rm and product
types.29
Iso-Elastic Demand: An Alternative Decomposition
Our decomposition exercise can be criticized on at least three dimensions. First, we
examine changes in the level of exports, while a more standard exercise would examine the
changes in log exports. As reported in Section 3, our measures of log demand demonstrate
substantially more variability than our measures of log productivity. Transforming these
variables into levels exacerbates this di¤erence. Second, using levels, as argued above, results
in our decomposition exercise being very sensitive to outlier observations. While we can
remove observations where we observe large changes, we also potentially discard the most
informative rms. Third, we only use our linear demand measure of rm-specic demand.
While our previous results suggest that either measure gives us similar qualitative ndings,
they often indicate non-trivial quantitative di¤erences.
To check the robustness of our results we also use a second model for decom-
position. Consider an iso-elastic demand function common to Melitz (2003)-type models
augmented for demand shocks: qimt = RmtPmt

Pmt
pimt
 
eu
I
imt where the variables Rmt and Pmt
are revenue and price aggregates which reect market size and competitiveness. The rm-
specic variables pimt and uIimt represent the rms price and demand shock. The optimal
pricing rule in this context allows us to write prices as a function of shipping costs, factor
costs and rm-specic productivity: pimt =  1
rccm
!imt
: Substituting the pricing rule into the
29A potential concern is that we have dropped the rms with the largest productivity improvements,
thus overstating the contribution from demand growth. However, as shown in Supplemental Appendix, if
anything, including outlier rms suggest even larger average contributions from idiosyncratic demand.
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demand function and taking logs we can derive the following demand function
ln qimt = ~C
I
mt    ln!imt + uIimt
where ~CIjmt captures market-product-year specic e¤ects. Our iso-elastic demand estimates
from Section 3 implies that an estimate of  for our sample would be ^ = 3:14.
Dene average log exports for each product market as ~QImt =
P
i imt ln qimt where
imt is dened as before, imt =
qimtP
i qimt
. The change in log aggregate exports is then
 ~QImt =  ~C
I
mt   ^
Imt + DImt where 
Imt =
P
i imt ln!imt, D
I
mt =
P
imtu
I
imt and
 ~QImt = ~Q
I
mt   ~QIm;t 1. Analogous productivity and demand contributions can then be
written as
Productivity Contribution =
^
Imt
 ~QImt
Demand Contribution =
DImt
 ~QImt
Our alternative decomposition addresses three concerns. First, we measure demand and
productivity in logs, rather than levels, shrinking the measured of large measured swings in
level demand. Second, we include all of the data in this exercise. Third, this exercise allows
us to present results from using the iso-elastic demand shock developed in Section 3. We
repeat this exercise separately for each product and market and report the results in the
bottom panel of Table 4.
We nd that the contribution from demand is even larger than that reported in the
top panel of Table 4, while the contribution from productivity growth grows substantially.
Across all markets and products, our results suggest that exports grew by over 37 percent per
year. Demand accounted for nearly 45 percent of total growth, while productivity accounted
for 4.8 percent. Broadly, this nding is again robust across various geographic regions, rm-
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type, and product di¤erentiation. The bottom panel of Table 4 does, however, reect the
fact that productivity growth did show a noticeably stronger contribution in most regions of
the world in our second decomposition, with the exception of Asia. Nonetheless, even among
regions where productivity growth explained the largest percentage of export growth, the
explanatory power of demand growth was always nearly double that of productivity, if not
more. Our results strongly suggest that understanding how rms succeed in acquiring and
growing demand in foreign markets is essential not only for determining rm-level decisions
across markets, but also how aggregate trade evolves over time.
Within Firm Demand Growth vs. Net Entry
To get a sense of where the gains in demand come from we further decompose
our measure of average log demand into components capturing within-rm demand growth,
the reallocation of demand across Chinese exporters and net entry. We decompose average
demand as
 ~Dmt =
X
i2C
im;t 1~imt +
X
i2C
(~im;t 1   ~Dm;t 1)imt +
X
i2C
~imtimt
+
X
i2E
imt(~imt   ~Dmt) 
X
i2X
im;t 1(~im;t 1   ~Dm;t 1)
where ~Dmt is our measure of aggregate demand is market m and year t, C is the set of
continuing rms, X is the set of exiting rms and E is the set of entering rms in year
t.30 For our demand measure, ~imt, we consider both our measure of log linear demand,
~imt = lnu
L
imt, and our measure of iso-elastic demand, ~imt = lnu
I
imt.
The rst term in this decomposition captures a within rm component based on
30To be clear, we dene an entering rm as a rm which did not export in market m in year t   1 but
exports to market m in year t. An exiting rm is a rm which exported to market m in year t  1, but did
not export to market m in year t. Our decomposition closely follows the straightforward decomposition for
aggregate productivity" proposed by Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001).
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rm-level changes, weighted by the initial shares in the export product market. The second
term represents a between-rm component. It reects changing shares weighted by the
deviation of initial rm demand from the initial product-market index. The third term is a
covariance-type term and captures the correlation between changes in demand and shares.
The nal two terms captures the e¤ect of entry and exit, respectively.31
The rst row of Table 4.1 reports the results for our decomposition of average
export demand. We nd, not surprisingly, that export demand grew rapidly over the 2002-
2005 period; the rst column of Table 4.1 indicates that average rm-level demand grew
by 29 log points annually. Our decomposition indicates that net entry and within-rm
demand growth are key contributors to total demand growth across export markets. Net
entry alone accounts for 53-63 percent of export demand across markets. It would be
mistaken, however, to interpret this nding as suggesting that Chinese exporters enter new
markets and immediately achieve export success. In fact, the decomposition suggests that
new entrants contribute negatively to demand growth. The large contribution of net entry
to demand growth comes from the exit of low demand rms. Thus, it is the very high rates
of churning in international markets that give rise these large changes in the composition of
exporters each year and, thus, growth in average export demand. Similarly, among surviving
exporters rm-level demand grows very strongly within rms. Just as demand was a strong
predictor of export survival, we also observe that among those that survive, we expect large
gains to existing demand shocks. In fact, our results suggest that within-rm growth in
31For purposes of comparison we also provide an analogous decomposition of average log productivity. We
decompose productivity as follows
 ~
mt =  
 X
i2C
im;t 1~!imt +
X
i2C
(~!im;t 1   ~
m;t 1)imt +
X
i2C
~!imtimt
+
X
i2E
imt(~!imt   ~
mt) 
X
i2X
im;t 1(~!im;t 1   ~
m;t 1)
!
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demand is nearly as important as net entry.
For comparison, we also provide analogous results for average productivity of Chi-
nese exporters. We nd very little growth by comparison. Annual physical and revenue
based productivity growth rates among exporting rms are only 1 or 2 percent, respectively.
However, a similar decomposition pattern presents itself. Within-rm growth and net entry
appear to be key sources of annual productivity growth, even if the changes are relatively
small.32
Conclusion
This paper studies the nature of rm selection across markets worldwide and the
evolution of rm-level productivity and demand in international markets. While both idio-
syncratic productivity and demand are strongly associated with key export outcomes, an-
nual market selection is largely determined by rm-specic demand rather than productiv-
ity. Entering and exiting rms are also found to be substantially di¤erent than incumbent
exporters. New exporters tend to be less productive, to have lower demand, and to charge
higher prices relative to incumbent exporters. Exiting rms, in contrast, tend to be less
productive, to have lower demand, and to charge lower prices on average. While important
di¤erences are found on each of these dimensions, it is the di¤erences in measured demand
that are by far the largest. Our estimates suggest that the measured demand of new ex-
porters is 55 to 66 percent smaller than that of the average incumbent exporter to the same
market.
These ndings also have important policy implications, particularly for developing
countries. We nd that growth in rm-level demand is the primary rm-level determinant
32The Supplemental Appendix presents a similar decomposition across regions of the world, types of rms
and product di¤erentiation. In each case, we nd qualitatively similar results.
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of year-to-year export growth, rather than productivity. Our decompositions imply that
rm-specic idiosyncratic demand growth explains at least 18 total export growth, while
productivity growth, in contrast, explains at most 5 percent. Further, the net entry of rms
into export markets explains 53-63 percent of export demand growth.
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Appendix
Variable Construction
Prices, Quantities and Revenues
We begin by calculating the average export price for each product using a revenue-
weighted geometric mean. We then convert observed prices and revenues to a common year
using the average annual price as a deator. Last, we aggregate the data to the annual
level, calculating average unit prices over the year, and repeat this exercise for each year
and product in the data.
Variable Inputs
We deate intermediate materials with the Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang
(2012) benchmark intermediate input deators. Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012)
construct these deators using detailed output deators from the 2002 National Input-
Output table. The intermediate input deators are largely at the 3-digit industry level.
Capital Stock
We dont directly observe the rms capital stock. Instead, denote the book value
of capital for rm i in year t as bit. Nominal new investment, niit, is calculated in each year
as
niit = bi;t+1   bit:
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We then deate nominal new investment niit by the Brandt-Rawski (2008) investment
deator for China to get real investment, iit. In the rst year of the sample, 2000, we
dene existing capital stock, ki;t=2000 as the book value of xed assets less accumulated
depreciation. In subsequent years we calculate capital stock using the perpetual inventory
method as
ki;t+1 = (1  d)kit + iit
where d is the depreciation rate. The depreciation rate is taken from Brandt, Van Biesebreck
and Zhang (2012) and is set at d = 0:09.
Input Shares
We assume that output of each product is produced by a Cobb-Douglas production
function. To calculate productivity we will need to calculate input shares for labor, materials
and capital, l, m and k, respectively, for each product. Let ~wit denote rm is total
nominal wage payments and compensation in year t. Typically, we would calculate the labor
share as total employee compensation divided by total revenue. Hsieh and Klenow (2008)
suggest that the wage bill, ~wit, and compensation data are very likely to underestimate
the labor share in the Chinese manufacturing data. We follow their approach whereby we
multiply each rms wage bill by a constant parameter, ~%, to inate the wage bill in each
rm. We determine the size of the constant parameter by choosing the parameter so that
the aggregate labor compensation in the manufacturing sector matches the labor share in
national accounts (roughly 50 percent).
Specically, denote the total, observed payments to workers as
tw =
X
i
X
t
~% ~wit = ~%
X
i
X
t
~wit = ~%ftw
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where ~% is the unknown ination parameter we need to determine and ftw denotes the total
observed labor compensation. Note that for this method to work we need to make sure
that we are summing over all rms in all industries, not just the industries we are going to
focus on. Denote total revenues tr and total intermediate materials tm. Hsieh and Klenow
(2008) suggest that the ratio of total wage payments to value added is roughly 50% from
the Chinese national accounts and input-output tables. This implies that
tw
tr   tm = 0:5)
~%ftw
tr   tm = 0:5) ~% = 0:5
tr   tmftw
Note that the procedure here is completed using all rms in each (4-digit) industry, not just
those from our selected sample. After determining ~% we can then calculate the labor share
in each of the industries we focus on as
l =
1
~N
X
t
X
i
~% ~wit
~rit
where ~rit are the rms nominal revenues, and ~N is the total number of rm-year observa-
tions. Likewise, we calculate the materials share as the average share of intermediate inputs
in total revenues,
m =
1
~N
X
t
X
i
~mit
~rit
where ~mit is the total value of materials used by rm i in year t. Finally, in the absence of
reliable capital share information we follow Hsieh and Klenow (2008) and assume constant
returns to scale so that k = 1 l m. We have alternatively tried estimating the input
shares, and productivity, using control function methods (Olley and Pakes, 1996). We nd
very similar measures of input shares and productivity. Moreover, our later results are all
una¤ected by this change. Results are available upon request.
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Figure 1: Export Revenue Distribution in the Full and Matched Samples
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Notes: The blue histogram captures the log export revenue distribution in the matched sample. The red distribution
presents the same information from the full rm-level sample.
Figure 2: Productivity, Demand and Export Sales
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Notes: The blue line captures the tted relationship between log export sales and productivity while the red line
captures the tted relationship between log export sales and average rm-level linear demand as dened in the text.
In each case we a exible functional form to capture the relationship between variables (fractional polynomials).
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Figure 3: Productivity, Demand and Export Frequency
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Notes: The blue line captures the tted relationship between the export frequency (months per year) of each rm and
productivity while the red line captures the same relationship with average rm-level linear demand as dened in the
text. In each case we a exible functional form to capture the relationship between variables (fractional polynomials).
Figure 4: Productivity, Demand and Export Market Entry
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Notes: The blue line captures the tted relationship between the number of export markets entered by each rm and
productivity while the red line captures the same relationship with average rm-level linear demand as dened in the
text. In each case we a exible functional form to capture the relationship between variables (fractional polynomials).
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Table 1: Average Percentage of Revenues From Exports
Undi¤erentiated Matched Full Di¤erentiated Matched Full
Product Sample Full Sample Product Sample Sample
Inorganic Salt 26.8 26.2 Wood Furniture 61.5 74.6
Ferroalloys 22.7 40.9 Wearing Apparel 62.4 71.3
Plywood 39.4 35.9 Seafood 55.2 49.3
Dyestu¤s 31.7 36.2 Kitchen Equipment 68.9 72.4
Silk Fabric 35.3 41.5 Metal Fittings 45.9 67.8
Notes: The second and fth columns document the average percentage of revenues from export sales in our matched
sample. The third and sixth column presents the same information for the full rm-level sample.
Table 1.1: Characteristics of the sample
Number of Observations
Product 2002 2003 2004 2005
Undi¤erentiated Products
(Inorganic) Salt 162 293 275 305
Ferroalloys 64 124 210 135
Plywood 54 110 216 288
Dyestu¤s 192 236 433 337
Silk Fabric 336 540 337 411
Di¤ereniated Products
Wood Furniture 524 750 1,231 1,305
Wearing Apparel 1,450 2,063 2,077 2,546
Seafood 206 259 333 366
Kitchen Equipment 955 981 1,247 1,176
Metal Fittings (for Construction) 313 475 612 590
Notes: This table reports the number of observations in each product category and year.
Table 1.2: Demand Estimation
Price Coe¢ cient 1 IV OLS
Estimate -3.140 -0.560
Standard Error 0.141 0.031
Notes: The above results correspond to estimated isoelatic demand curves described in Section 3. We estimate an
iso-elastic demand curve by IV and OLS. All regressions include product-market-year xed e¤ects. Standard errors,
clustered by rm, are in italics.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics for Exports, Price, Productivity and Demand
Correlations
Variables Physical Revenue Physical Revenue Model Red.-Form Price Capital
Exports Exports Prod. Prod. Demand Demand
Physical 1.000
Exports
Revenue 0.867 1.000
Exports
Physical 0.259 -0.050 1.000
Prod.
Revenue 0.004 0.065 0.194 1.000
Prod.
Linear 0.643 0.503 0.261 0.002 1.000
Demand
Iso-Elastic 0.173 0.127 0.096 -0.000 0.752 1.000
Demand
Price -0.470 0.032 -0.608 0.108 -0.331 -0.233 1.000
Capital 0.135 0.196 -0.218 -0.222 0.133 0.027 0.069 1.000
Standard Deviations
Standard 2.15 1.90 0.81 0.27 2.15 2.237 1.07 1.57
Deviations
Notes: This table shows the correlations and standard deviations for rm-level variables in our pooled sample of
rm-market-year observations. We remove product-market-year xed e¤ects from each variable before computing the
statistics. All variables are in logarithms.
Table 1.4: Turnover in International Markets
Full North South Rest Undi¤. Di¤.
Sample America Europe Japan Australia America of Asia Africa Prods Prods
Entry 0.530 0.398 0.502 0.307 0.402 0.543 0.492 0.596 0.565 0.508
Exit 0.397 0.317 0.320 0.276 0.321 0.493 0.404 0.462 0.431 0.376
Notes: This table presents annual entry and exit rates for Chinese exporters across product type and broad regions
worldwide. An entering rm is a rm that did not produce in a given country in the preceding period, but does in
the current period. An exiting rm is a rm which does produce in a given country in the current period but does
not in the next period.
Table 1.5: Persistence in Productivity and Demand
Revenue Physical Linear Iso-Elastic
TFP TFP Demand Demand Price Revenue
Persistence,  1.000 0.894 0.954 0.649 0.919 0.957
0.007 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.039 0.013
Notes: This table reports the results of autoregressive regressions, corrected for selection. Reported coe¢ cients are
those on the lagged dependent variable. Standard errors are in italics.
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Table 2: Determinants of Selection: Full Sample
Revenue TFP -0.162
0.053
Physical TFP -0.021 0.033 -0.008 0.022 -0.026
0.030 0.040 0.038 0.057 0.055
Linear Demand -0.348 -0.351 -0.345
0.011 0.012 0.015
Iso-Elastic Demand -0.052 -0.080 -0.080
0.004 0.005 0.007
Price 0.037
0.020
Age 0.450 0.370
0.052 0.049
Capital 0.098 0.008
0.061 0.059
Import Price 0.016 0.019
0.016 0.016
Distance -0.022 -0.022 0.163 0.177 0.198 0.163 0.187 0.183 0.223
0.025 0.025 0.033 0.026 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.044 0.042
Income -0.125 -0.125 -0.227 -0.220 -0.288 -0.229 -0.263 -0.238 -0.290
0.011 0.011 0.015 0.012 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.020 0.020
Notes: This table reports the results from various logit xed e¤ect regressions. Each regression controls for the
distance from China, average income (measured by real GDP) and time dummies. Standard errors are reported in
italics.
Table 2.1: Determinants of Selection by Firm-Type
Sample Private, Private, Foreign State-Owned
Ordinary Trade Processing Trade Firms Firms
Physical TFP 0.019 -0.039 0.059 0.134 -0.125 -0.152 0.139 0.127
0.057 0.055 0.108 0.109 0.089 0.090 0.080 0.077
Linear Demand -0.328 -0.423 -0.416 -0.343
0.017 0.032 0.033 0.022
Iso-Elastic Demand -0.070 -0.116 -0.112 -0.082
0.007 0.015 0.015 0.010
Distance 0.146 0.150 0.241 0.220 0.102 0.162 0.159 0.220
0.045 0.044 0.085 0.081 0.085 0.082 0.071 0.068
Income -0.244 -0.269 -0.232 -0.270 -0.221 -0.222 -0.259 -0.324
0.021 0.021 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.034 0.032
Notes: This table reports the results from various logit xed e¤ect regressions. Each regression controls for the
distance from China, average income (measured by real GDP) and time dummies. Standard errors are reported in
italics.
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Table 2.2: Determinants of Selection: Product Di¤erentiation
Di¤. Undi¤.
Physical TFP 0.066 -0.006 0.039 -0.027
0.044 0.057 0.042 0.055
Linear Demand -0.348 -0.340
0.013 0.015
Iso-Elastic Demand -0.079 -0.081
0.005 0.007
Import Price 0.035 0.036
0.018 0.018
Distance 0.165 0.196 0.186 0.226
0.038 0.047 0.026 0.045
Income -0.227 -0.232 -0.263 -0.283
0.017 0.021 0.016 0.020
Notes: This table reports the results from various logit xed e¤ect regressions. Each regression controls for the
distance from China, average income (measured by real GDP) and time dummies. Standard errors are reported in
italics.
Table 3: Evolution of Productivity and Demand
Dependent Variable
Revenue Physical Linear Iso-Elastic
TFP TFP Demand Demand Price Revenue
Entry 0.023 0.005 -0.030 -0.080 -0.793 -0.707 -1.085 -1.171 0.121 0.144 -0.682 -0.574
0.003 0.003 0.015 0.015 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.076 0.018 0.018 0.023 0.023
Exit 0.003 -0.006 0.034 0.009 -0.488 -0.441 -0.199 -0.412 -0.020 -0.008 -0.505 -0.445
0.003 0.003 0.015 0.015 0.029 0.029 0.024 0.076 0.018 0.018 0.023 0.023
Capital -0.039 -0.112 0.186 0.009 0.056 0.241
0.001 0.004 0.008 0.022 0.005 0.007
The above table presents the coe¢ cients on the exit and entry dummy variables. All regressions include product-by-
year-by-market xed e¤ects. Standard errors are clustered at the rm-level and are reported in italics.
Table 3.1: Evolution of Productivity and Demand
Dependent Variable
Revenue Physical Linear Iso-Elastic
TFP TFP Demand Demand Price Revenue
Private Firms, Ordinary Trade
Entry 0.012 -0.051 -0.729 -1.153 0.133 -0.616
0.003 0.020 0.037 0.097 0.023 0.030
Exit 0.010 0.060 -0.399 -0.378 -0.020 -0.427
0.003 0.020 0.037 0.097 0.023 0.030
Private Firms, Processing Trade
Entry -0.002 -0.051 -0.581 -0.828 0.093 -0.497
0.007 0.036 0.059 0.155 0.037 0.051
Exit -0.008 0.037 -0.469 -0.372 -0.040 -0.502
0.007 0.036 0.059 0.155 0.037 0.051
Foreign Owned Firms
Entry 0.036 0.104 -0.630 -0.562 -0.027 -0.674
0.006 0.030 0.057 0.145 0.034 0.049
Exit -0.017 0.031 -0.431 -0.313 -0.041 -0.472
0.006 0.030 0.057 0.145 0.034 0.049
State Owned Firms
Entry 0.021 -0.005 -0.384 -0.611 0.070 -0.322
0.005 0.023 0.052 0.127 0.029 0.044
Exit 0.025 0.016 -0.159 -0.094 -0.019 -0.173
0.005 0.023 0.052 0.127 0.029 0.044
Notes: The above table presents the coe¢ cients on the exit and entry dummy variables. All regressions include
product-by-year-by-market xed e¤ects. Standard errors are clustered at the rm-level and are reported in italics.
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Table 3.2: Evolution of Prices
Sample
Di¤erentiated Undi¤erentiated High Productivity Low Productivity High Demand Low Demand
Firms Firms Firms Firms Firms Firms
Entry 0.135 0.091 0.237 -0.046 -0.042 0.060
0.020 0.035 0.023 0.020 0.023 0.011
Exit -0.002 -0.084 0.198 -0.045 -0.128 -0.106
0.020 0.035 0.023 0.020 0.023 0.011
Notes: The above table presents the coe¢ cients on the exit and entry dummy variables. All regressions include
product-by-year-by-market xed e¤ects. Standard errors are clustered at the rm-level and are reported in italics.
High productivity rms are dened, product-by-product, as rms with a productivity level above the median product-
level productivity. Low productivity rms are dened analogously. Likewise, high demand rms are dened, product-
market-by-product-market, as rms a with linear demand shock above the median in each product-market.
Table 4: Decomposition of Aggregate Export Growth
Linear Demand Model (Trimmed Sample)
Percentage Explained By
Mean Annual Physical Export Market-Product-
Export Growth (%) Productivity Growth Demand Growth Year Shocks
All Prods/Countries 54.99 -0.114 18.00 82.11
North America 60.38 0.018 60.38 39.60
Europe 33.43 0.000 15.87 84.13
Japan 62.09 0.000 23.72 76.28
Australia 81.43 0.002 65.66 34.34
South America 109.15 0.000 21.34 78.66
Rest of Asia 45.47 -0.281 13.29 86.99
Africa 44.47 0.000 15.72 84.28
Private, Ord. Trade 46.78 -0.215 3.84 96.38
Private, Proc. Trade 31.66 0.031 9.90 90.07
Foreign Firms 37.19 0.000 18.58 81.42
State-Owned Firms 69.44 0.000 13.84 86.16
Undi¤. Products 43.75 -0.343 11.79 88.55
Di¤. Products 55.34 0.000 15.60 84.40
Iso-Elastic Demand Model
Percentage Explained By
Mean Annual Physical Export Market-Product-
Export Growth (%) Productivity Growth Demand Growth Year Shocks
All Prods/Countries 37.44 4.78 44.95 50.27
North America 125.94 10.92 24.02 65.06
Europe 5.62 24.01 52.46 23.53
Japan 74.47 9.47 78.09 12.44
Australia 163.61 14.98 37.57 47.45
South America 55.46 19.72 91.27 -10.99
Rest of Asia 40.88 -26.69 11.94 114.75
Africa 69.25 53.40 103.52 -56.92
Private, Ord. Trade 54.08 6.09 78.57 15.34
Private, Proc. Trade 8.29 5.72 50.11 44.17
Foreign Firms 13.03 16.33 55.15 28.52
State-Owned Firms 74.91 10.41 17.17 72.42
Undi¤. Products 41.78 -9.92 59.93 49.99
Di¤. Products 36.31 14.83 37.04 48.13
Notes: The top panel decomposes product level aggregate exports into its productivity and demand components.
Because our rst stage decomposition is based on the model, we present results using our linear demand measurement.
The bottom panel decomposes product level aggregate log exports into its productivity and demand components.
Because our second decomposition is based on the iso-elastic demand curve, we present results using our iso-elastic
measure of demand. In both panel, average export growth is the weighted average year-to-year export growth where
rm sales are used weights.
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Table 4.1: Decomposition of Demand and Productivity Growth
Total Components of Decomposition
Determinant Growth Within Between Cross Entry Exit Net Entry
Log Linear Demand 0.2872 0.0971 -0.3441 0.3831 -0.1130 0.2641 0.1512
Log Iso-Elastic Demand 0.8308 0.5254 -0.7901 0.5698 -0.1548 0.6804 0.5256
Log Physical Productivity 0.0099 0.0053 -0.0042 0.0021 -0.0005 0.0072 0.0067
Log Revenue Productivity 0.0183 0.0092 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0009 0.0089 0.0099
Notes: This table decomposes the productivity and demand components of average exports. The growth of each
component is the annual weighted average growth rate where rm sales are used weights.
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